103.4Correcting Pleadings

For templates with recommended language to use when charging specific criminal offenses, please see the related entry on Arrest Warrant and Indictment Forms.

Overview

A criminal charge contained in a pleading must be sufficiently definite to (i) identify the offense charged against the defendant; (ii) enable the defendant to prepare his or her defense; (iii) bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense; and (iv) enable the court to impose a judgment. State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499 (1970). If the pleading fails to satisfy one of these requirements, or is otherwise defective as described in the preceding sections, the prosecutor should attempt to correct the pleading as described below before proceeding to arraignment or trial.

Alternatively, the state may choose to dismiss the case and proceed on a new criminal pleading. The defendant may also move to dismiss the defective pleading (see G.S. 15A-302(e); 15A-922(e); 15A-924(e); 15A-952(b)(6); 15A-954; -955; -956), requiring either a correction, if possible, or a new charge, if necessary.

State’s Motion to Amend the Pleading

A statement of charges, criminal summons, arrest warrant, citation or magistrate’s order may be amended at any time before or after final judgment as long as the amendment does not change the “nature of the offense charged.” G.S. 15A-922(f); see also G.S. 15-24.1 (may amend ownership of property in a warrant); State v. Clements, 51 N.C. App. 113 (1981) (at the close of its evidence in superior court, state was permitted to amend misdemeanor death by vehicle charge by alleging failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident as a factor, instead of following too closely – court ruled that the amendment did not change nature of the offense charged). The state can make the amendment either by moving to amend the original pleading, or by replacing the original pleading with a misdemeanor statement of charges. See State v. Capps, 374 N.C. 621 (2020) (holding that statements of charges "function as amendments to prior criminal pleadings like criminal warrants but for convenience and clarity may completely supplant the prior pleading”).

A criminal information may also be amended, but only with the consent of the defendant. G.S. 15A-923(d). But see State v. Jones-White, 184 N.C. App. 758 (2007) (unpublished) (holding that G.S. 15A-923(d) was not violated, despite absence of defendant's consent, where amendment to offense date in criminal information did not substantially alter the charge and time was not an essential element).

G.S. 15A-923(e) states that a bill of indictment may not be amended. But in practice, despite the statutory prohibition against “amendments,” courts have frequently permitted certain “changes” to an indictment, as long as the changes did not “substantially alter” the charge, particularly when there was no prejudice or surprise to the defense. See State v. Price, 310 N.C. 596 (1984). The meaning of “substantially alter” is debatable, but appellate cases interpreting the issue over the years have established several categories of changes or corrections that prosecutors are usually allowed to make:

1. Correct the Date of Offense
   The state has generally been permitted to amend the indictment to correct the alleged date of the offense when it does not prejudice the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Coltrane, 188 N.C. App. 498 (2008) (correcting date of offense from December 9, 2004, to April 25, 2005); State v. Riffe, 191 N.C. App. 86 (2008) (state allowed to amend dates in indictments during trial; court ruled that trial judge did not err; court noted that time was not an element of the offenses, and defendant did not present alibi defense); State v. Whitman, 179 N.C. App. 657 (2006) (no error in allowing the state to amend the dates specified in the indictments charging statutory rape and sexual offense from “January 1998 through June 1998” to “July 1998 through December 1998”); State v. Wallace, 179 N.C. App. 710 (2006) (no error in amending date of statutory sexual offense indictment from “November 2001” to “June through August 2001”; defendant did not present an alibi defense that was adversely affected by the change in dates); State v. Lewis 162 N.C. App. 277 (2004) (state properly was allowed to correct second conviction alleged in habitual felon indictment, which had mistakenly noted date and county of defendant’s probation revocation instead of date and county of defendant’s prior conviction of felonious breaking and entering); State v. McGriff, 151 N.C. App. 631 (2002) (amending dates of sex offenses with young person); State v. Locklear, 117 N.C. App. 255 (1994) (amending an habitual felon indictment to change the date of the commission of a felony alleged in the indictment); State v. Kamtsiklis, 94 N.C. App. 250 (1989) (amending dates of beginning and ending of conspiracy offense); State v. Price, 310 N.C. 596 (1984) (amending date of murder from date victim died to date victim was shot).
2. Correct a Statutory Reference
   The state has generally been permitted to amend the indictment to correct an inaccurate statutory reference. See, e.g., State v. White, 202 N.C. App. 524 (2010) (trial court did not err by allowing state to amend habitual impairing driving indictment that mistakenly alleged a seven-year look-back period instead of the current ten-year look-back, when all of the prior convictions alleged in indictment fell within ten-year period, and language regarding the seven-year look-back was surplusage); State v. Hill, 362 N.C. 169 (2008) (no error in allowing state to amend short form indictment charging first degree statutory sexual offense by changing statutory reference for underlying conduct from “G.S. 14-27.7A” to “G.S. 14-27.4(a)(1)”).

3. Correct the Victim’s or Defendant's Name
   The state has generally been permitted to amend the indictment to correct the name of the victim, as long as the amended pleading still alleges the same person. See, e.g., State v. Hewson, 182 N.C. App. 196 (2007) (no error in allowing state to amend indictment to change the victim’s name from “Gail Hewson Tice” to “Gail Tice Hewson”); State v. Bailey, 97 N.C. App. 472 (1990) (correcting name of the victim where first and last name were reversed); State v. Marshall, 92 N.C. App. 398 (1988) (amending name of victim in pleading that inadvertently left out last name). But see State v. Shuler, 263 N.C. App. 366 (2018) (sex offense indictment which only identified victim as "Victim #1" was fatally defective).
   As long as the defendant was sufficiently put on notice that he or she was the person charged and will not be prejudiced by the change, amendments to correct the defendant's name have likewise been allowed. See, e.g., State v. Grigsby, 134 N.C. App. 315 (1999), rev’d on unrelated grounds, 351 N.C. 454 (2000) (no error in allowing state to amend spelling of defendant's name to add a missing letter); State v. Sisk, 123 N.C. App. 361 (1996) (where defendant was correctly named in caption, no error in allowing amendment to replace text in one part of charging language that inadvertently used victim's name; no prejudice or surprise to defendant); see also State v. Briggs, 249 N.C. App. 95 (2016), fn. 1 (“Defendant's first name was misspelled in the original indictment, but the trial court granted the State's motion to amend to correct his name”).

4. Changing Manner in Which Offense was Committed
   The state has generally been permitted to amend the indictment to revise minor factual details, or correct the manner in which the alleged offense was committed. See, e.g., State v. McCallum, 187 N.C. App. 628 (2007) (court ruled that state was properly permitted to amend armed robbery indictments to delete the amount of money alleged to have been taken; amendments left the allegations as the defendant took an unspecified amount of “U.S. Currency”); State v. Van Trusell, 170 N.C. App. 33 (2005) (no error in allowing state to amend indictment which charged attempted armed robbery to charge armed robbery); State v. Wiggins, 161 N.C. App. 583 (2003) (amending age difference between defendant and victim in prosecution for statutory rape under G.S. 14-27.25); State v. Brady, 147 N.C. App. 755 (2001) (amending indictment charging obtaining controlled substance by forgery by changing name of controlled substance); State v. Parker, 146 N.C. App. 715 (2001) (amending description of property in false pretenses indictment); State v. Brinson, 337 N.C. 764 (1994) (amendment to felonious assault indictment was proper because it did not substantially alter the nature of the offense charged; original indictment sufficiently charged that cell bars and floor of jail were deadly weapons, in addition to fists); State v. Joyce, 104 N.C. App. 558 (1991) (amending armed robbery indictment to substitute “knife” for “firearm”); State v. Clements, 51 N.C. App. 113 (1981) (defendant was tried in district court for misdemeanor death by vehicle based on following too closely as the underlying violation; in superior court, the state was permitted to amend charge at the close of its evidence by alleging failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident instead of following too closely – court ruled that the amendment did not change nature of the offense charged); State v. Carrington, 35 N.C. App. 53 (1978) (striking language concerning co-accessory to charge).

5. Changing Location or Address
   The state has generally been permitted to amend the indictment to correct the location where the offense is alleged to have occurred. See, e.g., State v. Grady, 136 N.C. App. 394 (2000) (amending address of dwelling in charge of maintaining dwelling for use of controlled substance); State v. Snyder, 343 N.C. 61 (1996) (amending habitual impaired driving indictment to include “public vehicular area” in addition to street or highway); State v. Hyder, 100 N.C. App. 270 (1990) (changing name of county in indictment).

6. Transfer Allegations of Prior Convictions to a Separate Count
   The state has generally been permitted to amend an indictment in which prior convictions must be alleged separately by transferring those allegations to a different count. See State v. Stephens, 188 N.C. App. 286 (2008) (trial judge did not err in granting state’s motion to amend felony stalking indictment by transferring allegation of prior stalking conviction into a separate count in indictment); State v. Hairston, 227 N.C. App. 226 (2013) (unpublished) (allowing state’s motion to amend an indictment for violation of a DVPO to properly allege a felony by splitting the existing indictment into two separate counts); cf. State v. Sullivan, 111 N.C. App. 441 (1993) (indictment improperly listed defendant’s prior convictions in same count that charged defendant with breaking into coin operated vending machine – court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, reducing the charge back down to a misdemeanor, so defendant could not be sentenced as an habitual felon).

When a Motion to Amend is Not Allowed

If the proposed amendment constitutes a “substantial change" to the indictment (e.g., curing a fatally defective indictment, or adding a new element of the offense), the state will need to seek a new indictment to correct the defect. If the state attempts to cure the defect through a motion to amend, the motion will likely be denied or reversed on appeal, as demonstrated below.

1. Changing Property Owner in Larceny/Embezzlement Pleading
   If a pleading that alleges larceny or embezzlement (or other interference with personal property offenses that require naming the victim) alleges the wrong property owner, the state's motion to amend constitutes a substantial alteration and will not be permitted. See, e.g., State v. Abbott, 217 N.C. App. 614 (2011) (trial court erred by allowing state to amend bill of indictment charging larceny by striking the word “Incorporated” from the victim’s name, since the business was actually a sole proprietorship this was a substantial alteration because it changed the alleged owner from a business entity to a natural person); State v. Hughes, 118 N.C. App. 573 (1995) (amendment to embezzlement indictment changing ownership from an individual to a corporation substantially altered the offense and therefore was improper).
   A pleading which fails to identify the victim of such an offense as either a natural person or a legal entity capable of owning property is fatally defective. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 368 N.C. 83 (2015) (“In Thornton we held that an indictment alleging the defendant embezzled money belonging to ‘The Chuck Wagon’ was ‘fatally defective’ because it failed to allege ‘that ‘The Chuck Wagon’ is a corporation, and the words ‘The Chuck Wagon’ do not import a corporation’”); citing State v. Thornton, 251 N.C. 268 (1960).
   Traditionally, this has been viewed as a fatal defect that could not be cured by an amendment to clarify that the named victim is a legal entity capable of owning property; however, some recent cases have allowed an amendment to cure this type of defect. See State v. Capps, 374 N.C. 621 (2020) (holding trial court did not err in allowing state to amend larceny and injury to personal propety warrants by changing victim's name from "Loves Truck Stop" to "Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc.” because "the language of the original warrant, if not perfectly accurate, made substantially clear what entity owned the property"); see also State v. Lewis, 230 N.C. App. 145 (2013) (unpublished) (finding no error where the state was allowed to amend the victim’s name in a larceny citation from “Sally Beauty” to “Sally Beauty Holdings, Inc.” and stating that the amendment did not change the nature of the offense charged).

2. Adding New or Different Elements to Offense
   If the proposed amendment adds new or different elements to the offense, it is a substantial alteration and will not be allowed. See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 267 N.C. App. 575 (2019) (prosecutor's amendment of larceny citation by striking through charging language and writing in "shoplifting" was impermissible because it charged a new and separate offense; trial court had no jurisdiction to enter judgment on it); State v. Hill, 262 N.C. App. 113 (2018) (error to allow state to amend kidnapping indictment by adding the term "bodily" to alleged "assault inflicting serious injury" facilitated by the kidnapping, since that changed the facilitated offense from a misdemeanor to a felony); State v. Cobos, 211 N.C. App. 536 (2011) (trial court committed reversible error by allowing state to amend indictment for drug trafficking conspiracy by adding “28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine,” because that was an essential element of a higher level offense; court also held that a defendant cannot consent to an amendment that cures a fatal defect because the issue is jurisdictional and a party cannot consent to subject matter jurisdiction); State v. Silas, 360 N.C. 377 (2006) (state was improperly permitted to amend felonious breaking and entering indictment to allege a different felony intended to be committed from “murder” to two felonious assaults because the amendment was substantial alteration of the indictment); State v. Moore, 162 N.C. App. 268 (2004) (indictment charging possession of drug paraphernalia alleged that the paraphernalia was “a can designed as a smoking device”; court ruled that trial judge erred in allowing state to amend indictment to change description of paraphernalia to a “brown paper container” because amendment constituted a substantial alteration of offense); State v. Moses, 154 N.C. App. 332 (2002) (error to allow state to amend pleading by adding allegation of a second aggravating factor to a charge of fleeing to elude – addition of a second aggravating factor raised it from a misdemeanor to a felony, which changed the nature of offense).

3. “Substantial” Change to Name or Date
   If the proposed amendment to a name or date would change the nature of the underlying offense, it is a substantial alteration and will not be allowed. See, e.g., State v. Winslow, 360 N.C. 161 (2005) (state was improperly permitted to amend habitual DWI indictment to change date of oldest DWI conviction, which elevated offense from misdemeanor to felony); State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315 (1994) (error to allow state to amend felonious assault indictment to change name of victim from “Carlose Antoine Latter” to “Joice Hardin”).

New Statement of Charges for a Misdemeanor

Prosecutor's Own Determination

Before arraignment in district court, a prosecutor may file a statement of charges upon the prosecutor’s own determination, and it may charge the same offenses as the original pleading or it may charge additional or different misdemeanor offenses. G.S. 15A-922(d); State v. Capps, 374 N.C. 621 (2020). Because a statement of charges totally replaces the prior pleading, the prosecutor must include any other charges that were in the original pleading in the new statement of charges in order to retain those charges. See G.S. 15A-922(a).

After arraignment in district court, the state may still file a statement of charges upon the prosecutor's own determination, but only if it does not change the nature of the offense charged. G.S. 15A-922(e); State v. Capps, 374 N.C. 621 (2020) (explaining that a statement of charges "is in substance an amendment to a criminal pleading" that for "convenience and clarity may completely supplant the prior pleading,” and therefore "the amendment can be made at any time as long as it does not alter the nature of the offense or is otherwise authorized by law").

Objection and Insufficiency

If a defendant objects to the sufficiency of a criminal summons, warrant for arrest, or magistrate’s order as a pleading at the time of or after arraignment in district court, or upon trial de novo in superior court, and the judge rules that the pleading is insufficient, the prosecutor may likewise file a statement of charges as long as it does not change the nature of the offense. G.S. 15A-922(e); State v. Capps, 374 N.C. 621 (2020) (holding that G.S. 15A-922(e)'s reference to an objection by the defense and finding of insufficiency by the court "simply clarifies that a prosecutor may still file a statement of charges in that circumstance if doing so does not change the nature of the offense”).

In either situation, the defendant is entitled to at least three working days (for preparing his or her defense) after (1) a statement of charges is filed, or (2) the time the defendant is notified about the statement of charges, whichever is later. However, the defendant is not entitled to additional time if the judge finds that the statement of charges does not materially change the pleadings, and additional time is unnecessary. G.S. 15A-922(b)(2); State v. Chase, 117 N.C. App. 686 (1995) (defendant in this case was not entitled to continuance after state filed statement of charges).

Recharge or Retrial of Dismissed Charges

There is no double jeopardy bar to a second trial when a charge is dismissed because an indictment or other criminal pleading is fatally defective. See State v. Blakney, 156 N.C. App. 671 (2003); State v. Whitley, 264 N.C. 742 (1965); State v. Jernigan, 255 N.C. 732 (1961); State v. Coleman, 253 N.C. 799 (1961); State v. Barnes, 253 N.C. 711 (1961). See also United States v. Akpi, 26 F.3d 24 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Thurston, 362 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Davis, 873 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1989).

There is similarly no double jeopardy bar to a second trial when a charge is dismissed because there was a fatal variance between the proof and the allegations in the charge. See State v. Mason, 174 N.C. App. 206 (2005); State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646 (1967); State v. Stinson, 263 N.C. 283 (1965); State v. Johnson, 9 N.C. App. 253 (1970). However, double jeopardy will bar a retrial if the judge incorrectly dismissed a charge for a fatal variance. State v. Teeter, 165 N.C. App. 680 (2004).

Juvenile Court Petitions

If the amendment would change the nature of the offense charged, then a juvenile petition may not be “amended,” even if the juvenile consents. See In re Davis, 114 N.C. App. 253 (1994) (judge erred in allowing state to amend petition to charge violation of G.S. 14-66, when it originally charged a violation of G.S. 14-59, because the amendment changed the nature of the offense charged and was not a lesser-included offense). However, G.S. 7B-2400 does permit the amendment of a juvenile petition as long as it “does not change the nature of the offense alleged.” Additionally, a juvenile is permitted to plead to any lesser-included offense of the originally charged offense contained in the petition. See G.S. 7B-1802; State v. Daniels, 51 N.C. App. 294 (1981) ("It is established in the criminal law that the greater crime includes the lesser"), quoting State v. Cooper, 256 N.C. 372 (1962).

If neither of those remedies is sufficient, the prosecutor may sign a new petition as the complainant, as long as the intake counselor follows the normal statutory procedures before the signing of a petition alleging delinquency and the prosecutor does not encroach on the important role of the intake counselor. See In re Stowe, 118 N.C. App. 662 (1995). The prosecutor should then dismiss the original petition once a new petition is obtained. For more information, see the related Juvenile entry on Defects and Amendments.