This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on August 19, 2026.
Trial court erred by dismissing the charges against the defendant pursuant to G.S. 15A-954(a)(4) as the defendant failed to show that he was irreparably prejudiced by the arresting officer’s testimony regarding the issuance of an earlier warrant against the defendant – testimony that violated the trial court’s pretrial order that no such evidence be offered.
State v. Cuadra, No. COA25-863 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2026) (Forsyth County) (Dillon, C.J.). The defendant was charged with assault on a female for punching a woman in the face at a bar. He was convicted in district court and appealed to superior court for trial de novo. Before trial, the superior court entered an order prohibiting the State from introducing evidence regarding another assault charge that was based on an alleged incident that had occurred earlier in the day before the defendant went to the bar. The defendant was acquitted of that alleged assault in a separate trial.
At trial, the State called two witnesses: the alleged victim and the arresting officer. On several occasions, the alleged victim recounted statements made by others at the bar to which the defendant’s counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The trial court sustained the objections and instructed the witness several times that she was not permitted to testify about what others said. The arresting officer then testified that he first encountered the defendant when he served a warrant on the defendant the day after the bar incident. Defense counsel objected and moved for dismissal of the charges under G.S. 15A-954(a)(4) as the warrant to which the officer was referring was the warrant for the alleged assault for which the defendant was acquitted. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the officer’s statement about the warrant and the alleged victim’s hearsay statements violated the defendant’s constitutional rights and that the defendant suffered irreparable prejudice.
The State appealed from the trial court’s order, and the court of appeals reversed the order granting the motion to dismiss and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
As to the trial court’s findings regarding the testimony from the alleged victim, the court of appeals concluded that the testimony did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights or prejudice the defendant in the preparation of his case. As to the testimony from the officer, the court of appeals determined that the trial court did not err in determining that the officer’s testimony violated its pretrial order but did err by dismissing the charges, noting that dismissal is “‘drastic relief’” that “‘should be granted sparingly.’” Slip op. at 14 (quoting State v. Joyner, 295 NC. 55, 59 (1978). The court of appeals suggested that the trial court could have given curative instructions or granted a mistrial. The court found nothing to suggest the defendant’s ability to prepare his case was irreparably prejudiced.
Judge Arrowood concurred in the result, writing separately to emphasize that “while the trial court was correct to identify issues with the State’s witness preparation, lesser sanctions were available.” Slip op. at 1 (Arrowood, J., concurring).
(1) Indictment for larceny was sufficient to confer jurisdiction; (2) Trial court did not err by proceeding with trial after the defendant fell in and out of sleep during jury deliberation; (3) Defendant failed to show that Harbison error occurred.
State v. Hardrick, No. COA25-905 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2026) (Mecklenburg County) (Murry, J.). The defendant was convicted in a jury trial of felony breaking and entering, felony larceny, and felony speeding to elude arrest. The charges arose from the defendant’s breaking into a Lowe’s Home Improvement store, taking items from the store, loading them into his car, and then fleeing in his car from an officer who attempted to stop him in the parking lot.
(1) On appeal, the defendant argued that the indictment for felony larceny was so defective as to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. The larceny indictment alleged that the defendant “‘willfully did steal store merchandise such as tools, the personal property of Lowe’s, a legal entity capable of owning property’” and that he did so “‘pursuant to a violation of [§] 14-54,’” (in other words, in the commission of felony breaking and entering). Slip op. at 3. The felony breaking and entering indictment alleged that the defendant “‘willfully did feloniously break and enter a building, occupied by Lowe’s, located at 10625 McMullen Creek Parkway, Charlotte, [NC], with the intent to commit a felony therein.’” Id.
The court of appeals found that the challenged indictment alleged the elements of the offense and provided the defendant with notice of the charges and the trial court with sufficient information to enter judgment. Thus, it held that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to try the defendant.
(2) The defendant also argued that the trial court erred by allowing the trial to proceed after noticing the defendant falling asleep during jury selection. After noticing the defendant’s difficulty staying awake, the trial court told the defendant that he could stand and stretch any time he thought he was about to fall asleep. The defendant said his inability to stay awake was caused by sleep apnea but did not provide any documentary support for this diagnosis. The court of appeals determined that these circumstances did not require the trial court to hold “a formal competency hearing on Defendant’s mental capacity.” Slip op. at 8.
(3) Finally, the defendant argued that defense counsel impliedly conceded his guilt of felony flee to elude arrest without the defendant’s consent, thereby providing ineffective assistance of counsel under State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 (1985). In his opening statement, defense counsel referred to some unknown reason why the defendant “‘was driving like that’” and made comments in closing about the officer’s estimation of the defendant’s speed. Slip op. at 11. The court of appeals held that the “acknowledgement of an uncontested (and visually recorded) fact that defendant drove a car that night does not ‘clearly demonstrate that an admission of guilt occurred.’” Slip op. at 11 (quoting State v. Nunnally, 929 S.E.2d 548, 558-59 (N.C. 2026). Thus, the court dismissed the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.