This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on February 18, 2026.
Competent evidence supported the factual findings in the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress; a defendant who pleads guilty has no right to appeal the denial of a motion in limine.
State v. Alston, No. COA25-291 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (Alamance). After nearly running an officer over outside a Burlington bar, the defendant was charged with impaired driving. She entered an Alford plea. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred by denying her pretrial motion to suppress and subsequent motion in limine to exclude a toxicology report and other expert testimony. As to the motion to suppress, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court’s denial of the motion was supported by competent evidence of seven findings of fact indicating that the officer had probable cause to arrest. Those findings included the defendant’s bad driving, a strong odor of alcohol, and initial refusal to perform field sobriety testing. As to the motion in limine, the appellate court pointed out that a defendant who pleads guilty has no right to appeal the denial of a motion in limine. Therefore, the court dismissed that portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The trial court erred by proceeding to trial and entering judgment without first determining that a defendant’s competency had been restored; a new trial is required when a meaningful retrospective determination of competency is not possible.
State v. Cooke, No. COA25-527 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (Caldwell). The defendant was charged with felony larceny and other crimes. In June 2023, a superior court judge found the defendant incompetent to proceed and ordered a follow-up evaluation. [Note: This appears to have been a determination of incapacity under G.S. 15A-1002, not an incompetency proceeding under G.S. Chapter 35A. This summary follows the language of the opinion.] In March 2024, a psychologist completed a second evaluation and issued a report indicating that the defendant was competent to proceed. However, the trial court did not adopt that report or make findings of restored competency. Nine months later, in December 2024, the defendant was tried and convicted.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court’s failure to hold a new competency hearing or enter findings of restored capacity violated G.S. 15A-1002 and due process. The court of appeals agreed. Under existing precedent, an incompetency adjudication remains effective until vacated. The appellate court rejected the State’s argument that the defendant waived the right to any further inquiry into his competence when he did not object before trial. The court explained that the constitutional right not to be tried while incompetent cannot be waived, and that an unvacated order of incompetence is, as a matter of law, substantial evidence that automatically triggers the trial court’s duty to conduct a competency hearing. Thus, even if the defendant forfeited his statutory claim under G.S. 15A-1002 by failing to raise it at trial, the trial court “failed to discharge its constitutional obligation to ensure defendant’s capacity to stand trial.” Slip op. at 7.
As to the remedy, the court vacated the defendant’s convictions and ordered a new trial. The court noted that a new trial was not automatically required, but here, given the 9-month delay between the second forensic evaluation and the trial, the record did not permit a meaningful retrospective determination of the defendant’s competency.
The trial court followed G.S. 15A-1214(g) and did not err by declining to strike a juror; a defendant who does not exhaust peremptory challenges could not seek reversal of the trial court’s declination to strike a juror for cause.
State v. Crowder, No. COA25-384 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (Forsyth). The defendant was charged with possession of firearm by felon and other crimes. During jury selection, one of the potential jurors told the judge she was concerned that the defendant had fallen asleep several times, which she viewed as “hugely disrespectful to the situation,” and potentially impairing her ability to be impartial. Slip op. at 2. The trial court asked if she could nonetheless base her decision on the evidence presented at trial. She replied that she didn’t know if she could. The defendant’s lawyer did not move to strike the juror and she was impaneled. After opening statements, the trial court asked again about the juror. Defense counsel expressed concern about the juror’s impartiality, acknowledged passing on her, and objected for the record that the juror had not been removed. The defendant was found guilty of possession of firearm by a felon and other crimes after a jury trial.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to excuse the juror under G.S. 15A-1214(g), which allows the judge at any time before impanelment to excuse a juror for cause if the juror had made an incorrect statement during voir dire or some other good reason exists. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in applying G.S. 15A-1214(g); it heard the juror’s statement, conducted an initial inquiry, and allowed the parties to ask questions. Defense counsel was given an opportunity to exercise a peremptory challenge and did not, and the trial court determined in its discretion that there was no basis for a challenge for cause.
As to defense counsel’s objection after the jury was impaneled, the appellate court noted that the statute allowing a defendant to seek a reversal based on a trial court’s refusal to allow a challenge for cause, G.S. 15A-1214(h), requires that the defendant first have exhausted all the peremptory challenges available to him. Here, the defendant used only three of his six peremptory challenges, and therefore could not seek reversal on the trial court’s denial of his post-impanelment challenge for cause.
The court of appeals dismissed the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without prejudice.
Failure to register as a sex offender is a specific-intent crime, but the trial court did not plainly err by instructing the jury that the defendant’s intoxication had no bearing on his guilt or innocence.
State v. Davidson, No. COA25-478 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (Iredell). The defendant was charged with failure to register as a sex offender after satellite-based monitoring location data showed he was barely at his registration address for over a month. At trial, the jury asked the trial court a question about the interplay between willfulness and being under the influence of drugs. After some discussion with the State and defense counsel, the judge answered the jury’s question with a modified voluntary-intoxication instruction, but did not define willfully. The defendant was convicted.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to define the term “willfully” in response to the jury’s question. The court of appeals dismissed the argument, concluding that the defendant neither objected at trial nor sought plain-error review, and that the issue was therefore waived.
The defendant also argued that the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that failure to register did not require specific intent, and therefore the defendant’s intoxication had no bearing on his guilt or innocence. After reviewing a series of legislative amendments from 1995 to 2006, including the addition of the word “willfully” as a mens rea requirement, the court concluded that failure to register is now a specific-intent crime. Accordingly, the trial court erred by instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication had no bearing on the defendant’s guilt or innocence. However, in light of the length of the defendant’s failure to register and the fact that he expressly declined to raise a voluntary intoxication defense, that error did not rise to the level of plain error.
Defense counsel’s failure to request recordation of closing arguments did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. Locklear, No. COA25-287 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (Robeson). The defendant was convicted after a jury trial of second-degree murder based on an incident where he ran the victim’s vehicle off the road. At trial, the defendant did not request recordation of closing arguments. On appeal, the defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that his lawyer’s failure to request recordation of closing arguments denied him meaningful appellate review, specifically on the issue of whether his lawyer might have conceded guilt during closing arguments without his permission in violation of State v. Harbison. Citing precedent from the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the court of appeals rejected the defendant’s argument, noting that a failure to request recordation is not a serious error since the governing statute, G.S. 15A-1241(a), requires recordation only upon request. Moreover, the defendant did not argue that a Harbison error occurred, only that it could have occurred. The appellate court concluded that the defendant therefore failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The court declined to invoke Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure to address a similar argument framed around constitutional due process.
The defendant waived appellate review of the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence by not objecting at trial when a witness testified to that evidence; there was sufficient evidence that the defendant failed to report a new address for the sex offender registry.
State v. Redfear, No. COA25-368 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (Iredell). When deputies were unable to locate the defendant, a registered sex offender, at his registered address, they found him at his sister’s house. There, a deputy asked him questions while he was sitting in a lawn chair in the front yard without advising him of his Miranda rights. The deputy arrested the defendant for an outstanding child support warrant. The deputy also spoke with the defendant’s sister, who said the defendant had been living with her for six to eight weeks. At trial, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress testimony regarding statements he made to the deputy at his sister’s house. The defendant was convicted.
On appeal, the defendant made three arguments, each of which was rejected by the court of appeals. First, he argued that the trial court failed to provide a rationale for its ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress statements made to the deputy. Because the defendant did not object when the deputy later testified at trial as to those statements, the appellate court deemed that issue waived.
Second, the defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the deputy to testify as to statements made by the defendant during a custodial interview without giving a Miranda warning. Because the defendant did not object at trial, the appellate court deemed the constitutional argument waived. The court declined to invoke Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure to review the issue.
Finally, the appellate court determined that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was ample evidence that the defendant was living with his sister and not at his registered address.
The trial court did not err in denying a competency evaluation; the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined the defendant’s request to subpoena all medical and penal records; the trial court complied with G.S. 15A-1242 in accepting the defendant’s waiver of counsel.
State v. Samson, No. COA25-317 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (Alexander). The defendant was charged with felony breaking or entering, larceny, and drug crimes, and with habitual felon status. Initially, his appointed lawyer had been communicating with the State about possible plea agreements, but the defendant made a request to proceed without counsel. After a hearing, the defendant waived counsel and the trial court allowed him to represent himself. However, upon hearing the details of the State’s plea offer, the defendant said he did not want to waive all counsel, but rather wanted to waive appointed counsel. His waiver form was amended accordingly, with an understanding that he would try to find his own lawyer. Nevertheless, when the matter came on for trial, the defendant said he wanted to represent himself.
From the jail, the defendant made a motion to determine mental capacity, which he clarified was a request for records related to his “lifetime addiction.” Slip op. at 6–7. After the defendant confirmed that he was “of sound mind and understanding right now,” id. at 12, the trial court denied the request. The jury found the defendant guilty and he was sentenced as a habitual felon.
On appeal, the defendant first argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a competency evaluation. After clarifying the distinction between competency, capacity to stand trial, and diminished capacity as a defense, the appellate court deemed the issue in question to be whether the trial court should have allowed “some other unknown type of evaluation to aid in proving involuntary intoxication at the time of the offense.” Id. at 13. After noting that a “trial judge cannot explain to a pro se defendant how best to mount a defense,” id. at 14, the court concluded that the defendant’s failure to request an expert or to request a relevant evaluation rendered the issue waived on appeal.
Next, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his request to subpoena jail, prison, and medical records that might show that he suffered from an addiction. Because the length of his addiction was not at issue, and because the defendant did not seek records that would illuminate his intoxication at the time of the crimes that might implicate ability to form specific intent, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request.
Finally, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself. The court of appeals concluded that the waiver colloquy ultimately conducted when the case was called for trial complied with G.S. 15A-1242 and related constitutional standards for a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel. Additionally, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court’s failure to inform him of approximately $4,000 in potential court costs meant he was not properly informed about the “range of permissible punishments” he could face—especially when the trial court had properly advised him of the nearly fifty years in prison he could face for multiple habitual felon charges.
The defendant did not contribute to the abuse of a juvenile when there was no involvement by the juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; the defendant did not willfully fail to discharge a duty of his office by encouraging a juvenile to use a taser on herself.
State v. Sanchez, No. COA24-644 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (Avery). The defendant was a sheriff’s deputy and school resource officer who helped run the “Police Explorers” program for students interested in law enforcement. The particular facts were disputed, but by all accounts, a 17-year-old student participating in a ride-along with the defendant used a deputy’s taser on her own leg. The defendant was convicted of contributing to the abuse of a juvenile under G.S. 14-316.1 and willfully failing to discharge duties under G.S. 14-230.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss both charges. The court of appeals agreed.
As to the charge for contributing to the abuse of a juvenile, the defendant argued that the State failed to establish the requisite relationship between the deputy and the juvenile. As charged, the crime defines “abused juvenile” as one whose “parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker” creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to the juvenile. The court of appeals agreed that the defendant clearly was not the student’s parent, guardian, or custodian, and that he also did not meet the statutory definition of “caretaker,” which applies only to those with responsibility for a juvenile in a residential setting. Without the involvement of a parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker, the State could not establish that the student could be adjudicated abused. And without that showing, the State could not establish the element that the defendant caused, encouraged, or aided the student to be in a place where she could be so adjudicated. Therefore, the court vacated the conviction.
As to the charge for willfully failing to discharge duties under G.S. 14-230, the defendant argued that he did not “omit[], neglect[], or refuse[]” to discharge a duty of his office by allegedly committing an unlawful act. The court agreed, distinguishing this situation from one where someone else’s external, unlawful act triggers a duty to which an officer fails to respond, which can constitute this offense. Here, the only alleged crime was the defendant’s own action, and G.S. 14-230 criminalizes omitting, neglecting, or refusing to perform duties, not violating the laws themselves. Were that not the case, the court said, any officer who violated a criminal statute could also be charged with willfully failing to discharge duties. Therefore, the court vacated the conviction.
The defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; the defendant’s 404(b) objection was not preserved when the same evidence was previously admitted without objection; the defendant was sentenced at the wrong prior record level based on the number of prior convictions.
State v. Strickland, No. COA25-523 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (Scotland). The defendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder and other crimes based on assaults on his mother-in-law, his wife, and a handyman. The offenses were joined for trial. The jury acquitted the defendant of assault by pointing a gun but convicted him of all the other charges. The State presented the aggravating factor of committing the offense in the presence of a minor, and the convictions were consolidated into three consecutive sentences, each from the aggravated range.
The defendant raised three arguments on appeal.
First, the defendant argued that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel in three ways: (1) not opposing joinder; (2) not filing notices of defenses or requesting jury instructions on self-defense or the castle doctrine; and (3) not calling the defendant to testify. As to joinder, the appellate court concluded that the offenses were properly joined based on their transactional connection. As to self-defense, the court concluded that the castle doctrine did not apply because the defendant was not a lawful occupant of his mother-in-law’s home, and self-defense did not apply because the defendant assaulted and choked his wife. As to the defendant not testifying, the appellate court noted that the defendant had expressly decided not to testify after the trial court conducted an extensive colloquy. As a result, the court of appeals rejected all of the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel arguments.
Second, the defendant argued that the trial court failed to exclude Rule 404(b) evidence when the defendant objected to the handyman’s testimony that he had smoked marijuana with the defendant. Because the handyman mentioned smoking marijuana with the defendant two other times during his testimony without any objection, the issue could only be argued on appeal as plain error, which the defendant did not do.
Third, the court of appeals concluded that the defendant was improperly sentenced at prior record level IV instead of level III. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the “presence of a minor” aggravating factor was improperly applied to the defendant’s conviction for “assault with a deadly weapon in the presence of a minor.” However, because that conviction was consolidated for judgment with the more serious offense of assault by strangulation which did not overlap the evidence used to prove the aggravating factor, the prohibition on the aggravating factor did not apply. The court vacated the judgments and remanded for resentencing based on the prior record level error.
The trial court did not err by instructing the jury on the aggressor doctrine when the defendant invited the victim to his home and shot him in the back.
State v. Villareal, No. COA25-219 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (McDowell). While at the defendant’s house, the defendant’s friend Davidson was in an argument over the phone about money with a man named Troutman. With the call on speakerphone, the defendant invited Troutman to come his house to get the money. When Troutman arrived, he and Davidson argued on the sidewalk in front of the defendant’s house, with Troutman eventually pulling out a metal baton. When Davidson yelled, “He has a weapon,” the defendant stepped onto the front porch with a gun and Troutman turned to run. The defendant shot him in the back and he died from the wound. The defendant was charged with murder. At the charge conference, the trial court agreed over the defendant’s objection to give the jury an instruction on the aggressor doctrine. The defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the aggressor doctrine. The court of appeals disagreed, noting that the justification defense of G.S. 14-51.3 and the related presumption of reasonable fear for a home’s lawful occupant under G.S. 14-51.2 do not apply to someone who initially provokes the use of force against himself or herself—a rule commonly referred to as the aggressor doctrine. G.S. 14-51.4; State v. Hicks, 385 N.C. 52, 60 (2023). Moreover, even someone who did not instigate a fight can be deemed an aggressor if they continue to pursue a fight that the other person is trying to leave. Here, there was evidence that the defendant was acting as the aggressor when he invited Troutman to his house, and that he shot Troutman in the back as he was trying to leave. The appellate court deemed that evidence sufficient to support an aggressor doctrine instruction and therefore found no error.
The trial court did not err by concluding that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel.
State v. Webber, No. COA25-613 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (Union). The defendant was arrested in October 2018 and charged with multiple felony offenses. He was assigned Attorney #1 as counsel. In July 2019, the case was delayed to await possible federal charges. Two years later, in August 2021, when the case was set for trial, the defendant made a request for a new lawyer, which the trial court granted. The court appointed Attorney #2.
Four months later, in December 2021, the defendant against asked for a new attorney. The court appointed Attorney #3.
The case came on for trial in October 2022. The defendant again asked for another attorney. The trial court gave the defendant time to speak with Attorney #3, directing them to a room outside the courtroom for privacy. After that 23-minute meeting, during which the defendant could be heard screaming at the lawyer, Attorney #3 moved to withdraw based on a breakdown in communication. After extensive discussion and review of the record, the trial court appointed Attorney #4.
The case came on for trial in October 2023, at which point the defendant informed Attorney #4 that he had retained Attorney #5. The case was continued to November 2023, but Attorney #5 did not appear. The case was continued again to March 2024. At that point, it was relayed that Attorney #5 was facing criminal charges herself. The trial court set an admin session in July 2024 and an August 2024 trial date, warning the defendant that he needed to be present with Attorney #6 in July to be ready for trial.
In July 2024, the defendant appeared alone and said he had not been able to hire Attorney #6. In August 2024, the defendant again appeared without a lawyer. After hearing an extensive review of the case history and reviewing the file, the trial court concluded that the defendant had forfeited counsel based on hiring and firing lawyers to delay the proceedings for over five years. The trial court also concluded that the defendant waived counsel by conduct by engaging in continued dilatory tactics after being warned. The trial court therefore ordered the defendant to represent himself. He was found guilty of six crimes.
On appeal, the court of appeals found no error, concluding that the defendant’s egregious conduct supported the trial court’s finding of forfeiture. In addition to the long passage of time in the case, the court noted that three of the first four attorneys were fired or conflicted out on the day the case was called for trial, showing the defendant’s intent to delay. The court also deemed the defendant’s accusations that his prior lawyers were lying to be frivolous. The court concluded that the defendant’s actions made representation impossible and sought to prevent a trial from happening at all.
Having concluded that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel, the court did not address the issue of waiver by conduct.