This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on February 4, 2026.
Superior court did not lack jurisdiction when misdemeanor charge was initiated by presentment; State’s evidence of misdemeanor death by vehicle did not vary from the indictment.
State v. Gibbon, No. COA25-415 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2026) (Buncombe County). The defendant was speeding on a mountain road, lost control of the vehicle, and crashed into a tree, killing a passenger. The grand jury returned a presentment, and the defendant was charged by indictment with misdemeanor death by vehicle under G.S. 20-141.4 with a predicate offense of failure to maintain lane under G.S. 20-146(a). The defendant was convicted by a jury and appealed. Before the Court of Appeals, the defendant argued: (1) the superior court lacked original jurisdiction to try him for a misdemeanor, and (2) there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence.
Addressing the first issue, the Court of Appeals noted the superior court has original jurisdiction to try a misdemeanor when, among other circumstances, the charge is initiated by presentment. G.S. 7A-271(a)(2). When the grand jury returns a presentment, the district attorney must investigate the factual background and submit bills of indictment when appropriate. G.S. 15A-641(c). Here, the defendant’s indictment was returned only after the grand jury had returned a presentment. The prosecutor’s investigation consisted of reviewing the case file to prepare the indictment. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that the investigation language of G.S. 15A-641(c) required the prosecutor to engage in additional fact gathering, and it concluded the superior court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
As to the second issue, the Court of Appeals said a variance between the offense charged and the offense shown by the evidence is essentially a failure of the State to prove the offense charged. Here, the defendant was charged with misdemeanor death by vehicle with the predicate offense of failure to maintain lane under G.S. 20-146(a). A person violates G.S. 20-146(a) by failing to drive upon the right half of the highway. G.S. 20-146(a). Here, the evidence showed that the defendant’s deliberate actions resulted in his losing control over the vehicle, departing from his lane, and colliding with a tree. This was sufficient evidence the defendant violated G.S. 20-146(a). The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that the State had to show he intentionally left his lane of traffic in order for the State to use violation of G.S. 20-146(a) as a predicate offense.
Trial court did not err in determining that good faith exception applied and evidence was admissible despite unlawful search.
State v. Julius, No. COA25-277 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2026) (McDowell County). On May 20, 2018, police responded to the scene of a single-vehicle wreck, finding a vehicle immobilized in a ditch. The defendant, who had been a passenger, told police that the vehicle belonged to her parents and a man named Kyle had been driving. Kyle fled the scene, allegedly because he had outstanding warrants. Without a warrant, police searched the vehicle for Kyle’s identification and found illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia. They arrested the defendant and found more drugs in her backpack.
The defendant was charged with various drug offenses, including trafficking in methamphetamine. She filed a motion to suppress, contending the search was unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury convicted the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver. The defendant appealed. Upon review, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress (opinion summarized here), and the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court concluded the warrantless search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment but remanded for a determination of whether the evidence should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule (opinion summarized here).
On remand, the trial court determined that probable cause existed and that the good faith exception applied such that the evidence was not subject to the exclusionary rule. The defendant gave notice of appeal. Before the Court of Appeals, she argued there was not probable cause for the search and, in any event, the trial court erred by concluding the good faith exception applied. Upon review, the Court of Appeals upheld the order. Chief Judge Dillon, writing the lead opinion, noted that the concurring judge disagreed with much of the analysis, limiting the precedential effect of the ruling.
Addressing the trial court’s finding that police had probable cause for a search, Chief Judge Dillon agreed with the trial court that the trooper had probable cause to search the vehicle for evidence of Kyle’s identity. As for the good faith exception, Chief Judge Dillon stated the exclusionary rule does not apply when officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on binding precedent. Prior to the North Carolina Supreme Court’s 2023 opinion in this case (holding the automobile exception did not apply to an immobilized vehicle), binding precedent indicated the automobile exception applied though the vehicle was undriveable. Based on its prior opinion in State v. Corpening, 109 N.C. App. 586 (1993), opinions from the United States Supreme Court, and opinions from several federal circuit courts, Chief Judge Dillon concluded the trooper here acted in good faith reliance on binding precedent, and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress.
Concurring in the result only, Judge Stroud agreed the trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress because the good faith exception applies, but she rejected the reasoning of both the trial court and the lead opinion. Judge Stroud said the exclusionary rule is applied when the benefit of deterring police misconduct outweighs the costs. Here, there was no evidence police engaged in deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights. Rather, the trooper was mistaken about whether the fleeing driver created an exigency sufficient to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. His belief was not culpable but was the type of objectively reasonable good-faith belief that does not warrant exclusion. Because suppressing the evidence would not serve any deterrent purpose, the trial court did not err by denying exclusion. Judge Stoud faulted the trial court and the lead opinion for considering probable cause when “[p]robable cause is irrelevant to the good-faith exception.” As for the officer’s reliance on binding precedent, Judge Stroud believed the automobile exception, both before and after the Supreme Court’s 2023 opinion in this case, would not authorize a warrantless search absent some exigency. Absent a change in law, she concluded, there could be no good faith reliance on prior binding precedent.
Judge Tyson dissented. According to Judge Tyson, the good-faith exception applies when officers reasonably rely upon (1) a warrant later determined to be deficient, (2) subsequently invalidated statutes, (3) erroneous arrest warrant information, or (4) binding appellate precedent. In his view, none of these exceptions are appliable here. Judge Tyson accused the lead and concurring opinions of expanding the good faith exception to include situations where police neither sought nor obtained a warrant. He said the State failed to prove the good faith exception applied to these facts. Judge Tyson concluded that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress.
State’s evidence was sufficient to show the defendant possessed a firearm; trial court did not err by excluding airsoft gun from evidence; G.S. 14-415.1 is not facially unconstitutional.
State v. Pride, No. COA25-367 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2026) (Guilford County). On July 12, 2023, the defendant allegedly assaulted his girlfriend, Natasha Smith, and her cousin Tabitha intervened. The defendant later went to Tabitha’s home, banged on the door, and yelled for her to come outside. Tabitha called 911 and told police someone was at the door with a gun. She provided Ring doorbell camera footage, and an officer recognized the defendant on the video. No firearm was recovered.
The defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon and habitual felon status. At trial, Smith testified her son owned an airsoft gun, but the trial court did not allow the defendant to offer the airsoft gun into evidence. The defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and pled guilty to habitual felon status. He appealed. Before the Court of Appeals, the defendant argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence that he possessed a firearm, (2) the trial court erred by excluding the airsoft gun from evidence, and (3) G.S. 14-415.1 is facially unconstitutional.
Addressing the first issue, the Court of Appeals said possession of a firearm by a felon under G.S. 14-415.1 requires the State to present evidence of (1) a prior felony conviction and (2) possession of a firearm thereafter. Here, the defendant stipulated to a prior felony conviction. The evidence further showed that Tabitha told an officer she saw someone with a gun, and she gave police Ring doorbell camera footage, which the jury viewed twice during deliberations. The Court of Appeals concluded this evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant possessed a firearm.
As to the second issue, the Court of Appeals recognized that relevant evidence is generally admissible, but that even relevant evidence may be excluded based on the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. N.C. R. Evid. 402, 403. Here, Natasha testified she had never seen the defendant possess the airsoft gun, and there was no evidence that the defendant went home to retrieve the airsoft gun. The Court of Appeals said the trial court could reasonably have concluded the airsoft gun was irrelevant or that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of confusing the issues. Hence, the trial court did not err by excluding the airsoft gun.
As to the third issue, the Court of Appeals upheld G.S. 14-415.1 as facially constitutional in State v. Nanes, 297 N.C. App. 863 (2025). The Court of Appeals said it was bound by that precedent and continued to hold G.S. 14-415.1 is facially constitutional under the state and federal constitutions.
Trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior conviction more than ten years old absent sufficient findings of fact, but error was harmless; trial court did not err by substituting an alternate juror after jury deliberations had begun.
State v. Toomer, No. COA24-1102 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2026) (Johnston County). On September 23, 2023, the defendant and Starnasia Shaw finished their shift at Taco Bell around 1:00 a.m. and Shaw got into the defendant’s car. Shaw testified that the defendant beat her, prevented her from leaving by driving around, and, when she managed to exit the vehicle, dragged her back to the car. Shaw testified that the defendant also threatened her with a knife, cutting her hand in the process.
The defendant was charged with, among other things, second-degree kidnapping, assault on a female, and habitual felon status. At trial, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to ask the defendant about his 1996 convictions for second-degree kidnapping and armed robbery. After jury deliberations began, the trial court replaced a sitting juror with an alternate juror, advising the jury to begin deliberations anew. The defendant was convicted by the jury of felonious restraint and assault on a female, and he pled guilty to habitual felon status. The defendant appealed. Before the Court of Appeals, the defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) admitting evidence of his 1996 convictions, and (2) allowing the substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations had begun.
Addressing the first issue, the Court of Appeals noted that Rule 609 governs the admissibility of prior convictions to attack a witness’s credibility. Evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old is inadmissible unless (1) the proponent of the evidence gives sufficient notice, and (2) the trial court determines that the probative value of the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. N.C. R. Evid. 609(b). The trial court must make findings addressing the impeachment value of the prior crime, its remoteness, and the centrality of the defendant’s credibility to the case. Here, the trial court ruled that the 1996 convictions were admissible because they were substantially similar to the offenses for which the defendant was on trial. The Court of Appeals found the trial court’s findings of fact were inadequate, and the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the defendant’s 1996 convictions. Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, however, the Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant failed to show the error was prejudicial.
As to the second issue, the Court of Appeals cited G.S. 15A-1215(a) for the proposition that the judge may permit the seating of one or more alternate jurors. If an alternate juror replaces a juror after deliberations have begun, the trial court must instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew. G.S. 15A-1215(a). In State v. Chambers, 387 N.C. 521 (2025), the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of G.S. 15A-1215(a). Here, the trial court instructed the jury to begin deliberations anew when it substituted an alternate juror. The Court of Appeals concluded that, under Chambers, the trial court did not violate the defendant’s state constitutional right to a jury.