Trial court did not err by failing to intervene in prosecutor’s closing argument; trial court did not err by declining to instruct on assault inflicting serious injury as a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury; trial court erred by sentencing for both assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and assault inflicting serious bodily injury based on the same conduct.
State v. Broadway, No. COA25-1159 (N.C. Ct. App. July 1, 2026) (Mecklenburg Co.). Defendant and his girlfriend Shayla Prioleau lived together in her Charlotte townhouse. On the evening of December 29, 2020, Defendant attacked Prioleau, strangling her until she lost consciousness. Prioleau sustained serious injuries, including a broken cheekbone, multiple lacerations to the head, and bilateral carotid artery dissections. During a search of the townhouse, police found a rifle against the bathroom wall with blood on it. Defendant was arrested on December 31, 2020, and charged with attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, assault inflicting serious bodily injury, and assault inflicting serious injury by strangulation.
The matter came on for trial by jury. During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor set a timer and held her breath to show the time it takes for respiration to cease during strangulation. She also stated that Defendant beat Prioleau with a rifle while she was unconscious. During the charge conference, Defendant requested an instruction on assault inflicting serious injury as a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and assault inflicting serious bodily injury, but the trial court gave the requested instruction only as to assault inflicting serious bodily injury. Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court arrested judgment on the conviction for assault inflicting serious injury by strangulation, and it entered consecutive judgments for attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and assault inflicting serious bodily injury. Defendant appealed.
Preliminarily, the Court of Appeals denied the State’s Rule 9(b)(5) motion to supplement the record to alter the certified transcript’s description of a demonstration that occurred during the prosecutor’s closing argument, explaining that the time for objections to the transcript had passed.
Before the Court of Appeals, Defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) failing to intervene in the prosecutor’s closing argument, (2) declining to instruct the jury on assault inflicting serious injury as a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and (3) sentencing him for both assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and assault inflicting serious bodily injury based on the same conduct.
Defendant first argued the trial court erred by failing to intervene in the State’s closing argument. As Defendant failed to object, the Court of Appeals reviewed for gross impropriety. Addressing an argument that the prosecutor’s demonstration of the time it takes for respiration to cease during strangulation was inflammatory, the Court of Appeals found that the demonstration tracked the evidence and was tied to the issue of premeditation and deliberation. Addressing an argument that the prosecutor’s statement that Defendant beat Prioleau after she lost consciousness was not based on record evidence, the Court of Appeals found that the argument was supported by reasonable inference from the evidence. As for the argument that it was improper for the prosecutor to describe the facts and holdings of three other cases, the Court of Appeals found the statements improper, but given the overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt and the brevity of the statements in context, the Court of Appeals did not find the statements so infected the trial with unfairness as to render the conviction fundamentally unfair. In sum, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court did not reversibly err by failing to intervene ex mero motu in the prosecutor’s closing argument.
Defendant next argued the trial court erred by declining to instruct on assault inflicting serious injury as a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. The Court of Appeals posited that the trial court must instruct on assault inflicting serious injury as a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury if evidence of the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon – and hands may constitute a deadly weapon – is contested. Here, the Court of Appeals found Defendant’s manual strangulation of the victim caused substantial injury. It concluded the State’s evidence was positive and uncontradicted, and the trial court did not err by failing to instruct on the lesser included offense.
Defendant next argued the trial court erred by sentencing him for both assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and assault inflicting serious bodily injury based on the same conduct. Assault inflicting serious bodily injury is a Class F felony unless the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment. G.S. 14-32.4. The Court of Appeals said that, because G.S. 14-32.4 indicates clear legislative intent that a defendant may not be convicted of assault inflicting serious bodily injury if the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment, assault inflicting serious bodily injury “merges with” assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury “under the double jeopardy clause.” It rejected the State’s argument that the two convictions arose from two separate assaults, finding insufficient evidence of a distinct interruption. It concluded Defendant could not be punished for both assault inflicting serious bodily injury and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. The Court of Appeals arrested judgment on the conviction for assault inflicting serious bodily injury and remanded for resentencing.
Trial court did not plainly err by failing to instruct the jury on a guilty knowledge element of drug trafficking by possession and trafficking by transportation; trial court did not plainly err by admitting evidence about the arrest of two other people who did not testify at trial.
State v. Fair, No. COA25-880 (N.C. Ct. App. July 1, 2026) (Guilford Co.). On October 8, 2019, Defendant drove to the Compare Foods Supermarket in Greensboro, where he accepted delivery of a package from Juan Olmos. Police stopped Defendant’s car and found a package containing 986.5 grams of heroin. In May 2020, Defendant was indicted for two counts of heroin trafficking.
The matter came on for trial by jury in September 2024. At trial, DEA agent Christopher Morgan testified about the investigation, including the arrest of Juan Olmos and his supplier Jose Garcia. The trial court instructed the jury on trafficking by possession and trafficking by transportation. Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court entered judgment, and Defendant appealed.
Before the Court of Appeals, Defendant argued the trial court plainly erred by: (1) failing properly to instruct on the guilty knowledge element and (2) admitting evidence about Garcia’s and Olmos’s arrest.
Defendant first argued the trial court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury that the State had to prove he knew that the substance he possessed and transported was heroin. See NCPI – Crim. 260.17 n.6, Crim – 260.30 n.6. The Court of Appeals posited that a conviction for heroin trafficking requires proof the defendant knew the identity of the controlled substance. But absent evidence to the contrary, a defendant’s knowledge is presumed, and the trial court must instruct on this element only when the defendant asserts a lack of guilty knowledge. The Court of Appeals reviewed several cases to illustrate how this condition is satisfied. See State v. Lopez, 176 N.C. App. 538 (2006) (defendant testified he did not know the contents of a refrigerator he agreed to receive); State v. Coleman, 227 N.C. App. 354 (2013) (State’s evidence included video of defendant saying he believed box contained only marijuana and cocaine not marijuana and heroin). Here, the Court of Appeals found Defendant failed to assert any lack of guilty knowledge. It concluded the trial court did not err by failing to include the additional guilty knowledge instruction. Even assuming error, the Court of Appeals also found Defendant failed to show the error probably affected the outcome.
Defendant next argued the trial court plainly erred by allowing Agent Morgan to testify that Garcia and Olmos were arrested and charged as part of the investigation because neither was called as a witness at Defendant’s trial. The Court of Appeals cited State v. Batchelor, 157 N.C. App. 421 (2003), for the proposition that evidence of convictions, guilty pleas, and pleas of nolo contendere of non-testifying co-defendants is inadmissible unless introduced for a legitimate purpose. Assuming the trial court erred by admitting the evidence here, the Court of Appeals said, any such error would not amount to plain error because there was no evidence that Garcia and Olmos had been found guilty, pleaded guilty, or pleaded nolo contendere to the charges. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err at all by admitting Agent Morgan’s testimony.
Trial court did not err by denying motion for mistrial based on alleged misconduct by interpreter; trial court did not err by denying motion to dismiss first-degree kidnapping charges; trial court did not err by denying motion to dismiss misdemeanor child abuse charges.
State v. Sandi, No. COA25-430 (N.C. Ct. App. July 1, 2026) (Alamance Co.). Defendant and his wife, Haniyeh Khodaverdian, are Iranian nationals and speak Farsi. On May 14, 2020, Defendant attacked his wife with a knife in their bedroom in front of their two children. Khodaverdian escaped to a neighbor’s house and called 911. After a prolonged and violent struggle, police subdued and arrested Defendant. On May 26, 2020, Defendant was indicted for twenty-one felonies.
The trial court appointed an interpreter for Khodaverdian. The matter came on for trial by jury in February 2024. At trial, Defendant sought a mistrial based on the interpreter’s conduct, contending the interpreter chose words and made gestures intending to influence the jury. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant was convicted of, among other things, attempted murder, first-degree kidnapping, assault by strangulation, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury with a minor present, and misdemeanor child abuse. The trial court imposed six consecutive judgments. Defendant appealed.
Before the Court of Appeals, Defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion for a mistrial, (2) denying his motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree kidnapping, and (3) denying his motion to dismiss the charge of misdemeanor child abuse.
Defendant first argued the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on the interpreter’s disregard for the ethics code promulgated by the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC). The Court of Appeals began by reviewing the AOC’s ethical and procedural standards for foreign-language interpreters in state courts within the state’s constitutional framework. By statute, the judge must declare a mistrial on the defendant’s motion if there occurs during trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s case. G.S. 15A-1061. The Court of Appeals said both the grant of a mistrial and the appointment of a foreign-language interpreter lie within the trial court’s sound discretion. This discretion, the Court of Appeals said, extends to assessing whether a foreign-language interpreter’s performance results in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s case warranting a mistrial. Here, Defendant moved for a mistrial based on the interpreter (1) mimicking Khodaverdian’s stabbing hand motion when translating testimony about the stabbing, (2) choosing English words he believed fit from his own experience instead of asking the court for guidance, (3) mistranslating the word “knife” as “gun” before correcting himself, and (4) repeating the word “go” twice when Khodaverdian said it once. The Court of Appeals said the trial court’s many oral findings showed its thoughtful and deliberative consideration of Defendant’s argument. Noting that Defendant declined to accept an offered limiting instruction, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial was neither arbitrary nor manifestly unsupported by reason.
Defendant next argued the State’s evidence of misdemeanor child abuse was insufficient because the State offered no evidence Defendant’s daughter was at substantial risk of physical injury during Defendant’s assault on Khodaverdian. A parent of a child less than 16 years of age who creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of physical injury upon or to the child by other than accidental means is guilty of misdemeanor child abuse. G.S. 14-318.2(a). The Court of Appeals reviewed child abuse cases to illustrate a substantial risk of injury. See State v. Watkins, 247 N.C. App. 391 (2016) (lack of parental supervision can create substantial risk of injury); State v. Adams, 285 N.C. App. 379, 384 (2022) (act of pulling a child can create a substantial risk of injury). Here, the Court of Appeals found that evidence of Defendant’s stabbing Khodaverdian in his daughter’s presence supported an inference that Defendant exposed his daughter to substantial risk of injury.
Defendant next argued the State’s evidence of first-degree kidnaping was insufficient because the State offered no evidence of confinement, restraint, or removal separate from any inherent in the assaults and attempted murder. A person commits kidnapping by unlawfully confining, restraining, or removing another person without consent for the purpose of, among other things, facilitating a felony or doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing her. G.S. 14-39(a). Here, the Court of Appeals found that evidence of Defendant’s trapping Khodaverdian in the bedroom corner supported an inference that he confined her without consent for the purpose of doing bodily harm. As for Defendant’s argument that there was not sufficient evidence of restraint or confinement beyond what was necessary for the attempted murder and assaults, the Court of Appeals construed this as a double jeopardy argument. It found Defendant failed to preserve any double jeopardy claim, but, even if he had, double jeopardy does not preclude imposing punishment for kidnapping, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and assault by strangulation when the legislature intends to punish them as separate offenses. The Court of Appeals recognized a conviction for kidnapping requires evidence of restraint beyond what is inherent in another felony. It said that restraint is not an element of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, assault by strangulation, or attempted murder. In any event, the Court of Appeals said, the evidence showed Khodaverdian’s restraint independent from the elements of the “underlying felonies,” and the kidnapping conviction did not violate double-jeopardy principles.
Judge Hampson concurred by separate opinion. First, he said, the Court of Appeals reviews the denial of a mistrial for abuse of discretion. There was no suggestion here, he said, to apply a standard of review applicable to administrative claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, and any analysis on that front only confuses the matter. Second, Judge Hampson believed that there was sufficient evidence of restraint or confinement beyond that inherent in the other offenses, namely Defendant’s trapping Khodaverdian behind the door, to support the kidnapping conviction.
Trial court did not err by admitting evidence of other personal checks; trial court did not err by ordering $53,150 in restitution; trial court did not err by denying motion to dismiss charge of obtaining property by false pretenses; trial court did not plainly err in its jury instructions.
State v. Thompson, No. COA25-1017 (N.C. Ct. App. July 1, 2026) (Nash Co.) In 2017, Defendant agreed with Tony Ellis, an agent for Triple Star Auto, to purchase used cars for resale by Triple Star Auto. Ellis delivered to Defendant personal checks from Triple Star Auto made out to dealerships in Wilson, North Carolina. Defendant took thirteen checks from Triple Star Auto – modified by adding “Thompson Auto” or “TA” as an additional recipient – and deposited them in his “Thomspon Auto” account at Providence Bank. Ultimately, Defendant received $61,000 in checks but never delivered the cars or titles. On May 13, 2019, Defendant was indicted for thirteen counts of obtaining property by false pretenses and thirteen counts of uttering a forged instrument.
The matter came on for trial by jury. At trial, the State introduced three additional checks, written by Thompson Auto, that were returned for insufficient funds. Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences, suspended those sentences, and placed Defendant on supervised probation. Defendant was ordered to pay $53,150 in restitution. Defendant appealed.
Before the Court of Appeals, Defendant argued the trial court erred: (1) by admitting evidence of other personal checks, (2) by ordering him to pay restitution of $53,150, (3) by not dismissing the charge of obtaining property by false pretenses, and (4) in its jury instructions on false pretenses.
Defendant first argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence of other checks, contending that the evidence was not sufficiently similar to the charged offense. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith; it may however by admissible for other purposes. N.C. R. Evid. 404(b). Before admitting Rule 404(b) evidence, the trial court must consider whether the evidence is sufficiently similar and temporally proximate to the crime charged. Here, the trial court admitted evidence that Defendant received a check from Ellis on behalf of Triple Star Auto to purchase a Subaru from Southern States, that Defendant cashed the check, and that he wrote three checks to Southern States that were returned for insufficient funds. The Court of Appeals said, similarly, in this case, Defendant was charged with cashing Triple Star Auto checks into his own account and never providing the title or vehicle. The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court properly admitted these checks under Rule 404(b) and did not abuse its discretion by admitting the checks under Rule 403.
Defendant next argued the trial court erred by ordering him to pay restitution of $53,150 despite Ellis’s having received a settlement payment from Providence Bank for $5,000. As a condition of probation, a defendant may be required to make restitution to an aggrieved party for damage or loss caused by the defendant. G.S. 15A-1343(d). The Court of Appeals said prior civil settlement agreements are not limitations on the amount of restitution allowed in criminal proceedings. Here, the trial court considered Defendant’s request to deduct from the restitution amount $5,000 due to the settlement from Providence Bank to Ellis. The trial court stated that there was evidence that the settlement amount only paid for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals found the restitution amount was supported by record evidence and concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Defendant next argued there was insufficient evidence of obtaining property by false pretenses as the State failed to prove the victim was “a person within the State” as required by G.S. 14-100. The Court of Appeals recited the elements of obtaining property by false pretenses: (1) a false representation of a subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which is calculated and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by which one person obtains or attempts to obtain value from another. The Court of Appeals declared there is no additional element beyond this. It concluded the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Defendant next argued the trial court plainly erred in its jury instructions by excluding the element of a person within the State. For the reasons above, the Court of Appeals found no plain error.
Trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s request to represent himself at trial.
State v. Wilder, No. COA25-1153 (N.C. Ct. App. July 1, 2026) (New Hanover Co.) The Court of Appeals’ recitation of the facts supporting the criminal charges is limited to a single sentence: “The State’s evidence tended to show that Defendant was generally menacing residents in his neighborhood and, specifically, that he was intimidating individuals who were prospective witnesses to court matters.” (cleaned up). Defendant was subsequently charged with five counts of felony intimidating a witness and two counts of misdemeanor communicating threats.
The matter came on for trial by jury in September 2024. During pretrial motions, Defendant indicated he wished to discharge appointed counsel and represent himself. The trial court addressed Defendant personally and attempted to conduct the colloquy required by G.S. 15A-1242, but Defendant refused to answer questions. The trial court denied Defendant’s request to proceed pro se, and Defendant was represented by appointed counsel at trial (his seventh appointed attorney). On September 26, 2024, Defendant was convicted of two counts of felony intimidating a witness and two counts of communicating threats. Judgment was entered, and Defendant appealed.
Before the Court of Appeals, Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his request to represent himself at trial. The Court of Appeals recognized that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as well as a right to self-representation. Before a defendant may exercise his right to represent himself, however, the trial court must ascertain that he (1) clearly and unequivocally expressed a desire to proceed pro se, and (2) knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel. By statute, a defendant is permitted to represent himself only after the trial court is satisfied that the defendant (1) has been advised of his right to counsel, (2) understands and appreciates the consequences of the decision, and (3) comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments. G.S. 15A-1242. Here, the Court of Appeals found that Defendant clearly and unequivocally expressed a desire to proceed pro se. But when the judge tried to conduct the colloquy required by G.S. 15A-1242, asking the questions prescribed by State v. Moore, 362 N.C. 319 (2008), Defendant “offered not an answer but a complaint of his own.” The Court of Appeals observed that “Defendant’s responses to the court’s questions confirm that he did not understand the consequences of representing himself.” The Court of Appeals said that a judge can find a defendant understands and appreciates the consequences of his decision “only if the defendant answers the questions,” and, by refusing, Defendant here left the judge without “the showing the statute demands.” The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s request to discharge appointed counsel and represent himself.