This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on March 18, 2026.
(1) Insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury where the assault victim was beaten unconscious and suffered multiple facial fractures but only spent one night in the hospital and only experienced pain for a day or two. (2) Ring doorbell video clips were sufficiently authenticated by the testimony of the camera’s owner.
State v. Butler, __ N.C. App. __ (Mar. 18, 2026) (Brunswick County) (Hampson, J.). The defendant and his girlfriend Nicole were drinking at a friend’s home when they began to argue. The defendant damaged a window of Nicole’s vehicle. Nicole got in the defendant’s truck and tried to drive away, but another guest, Tim, pulled her out of the vehicle and placed her in a chokehold on the ground. This enraged the defendant, who attacked Tim, beating him unconscious and causing multiple facial fractures. The defendant and Nicole left the scene, with Nicole driving over Tim’s leg in the process. The defendant was charged with, and convicted of, assault inflicting serious bodily injury. He appealed.
The court of appeals ruled that the evidence of serious bodily injury was insufficient. By statute, a serious bodily injury is one that involves “a substantial risk of death, or that causes serious permanent disfigurement, coma, a permanent or protracted condition that causes extreme pain, or permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or that results in prolonged hospitalization.” G.S. 14-32.4(a). Here, Tim was hospitalized overnight, released, did not take prescription painkillers, and testified that the pain lasted only a day or two. The court remanded for entry of judgment on the lesser included offense of assault inflicting serious injury.
The court of appeals found no plain error in the admission of evidence about Nicole driving over Tim’s leg. Evidence about the extent of Tim’s leg injuries was excluded, but evidence such as “witness testimony describing the sequence of events” and pictures of tire tracks was admitted without objection. Assuming arguendo that this evidence was irrelevant, its admission was not plain error because it did not likely change the result. The jury was instructed to focus on the defendant’s brutal beating of Tim, and there was ample evidence of the assault.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial judge’s decision to admit ten video clips from the Ring doorbell camera installed at the host’s home. An officer watched the videos on the host’s cell phone and recorded them using his own cell phone. Video evidence may be admitted as “the accurate product of an automated process under Rule 901(b)(9),” if there is evidence that the equipment was working and recorded accurately. Here, the host testified that the camera was working on the night in question. Ther was also sufficient evidence that the clips introduced at trial were the same as the ones the Ring camera had recorded. The host testified that the was no way to alter the videos and she had not altered them; the officer testified that he recorded them from the host’s phone; and the host testified that the exhibits was “the videos that the officer got from my camera.” This sufficiently authenticated the videos.
The defendant noted that the ten clips were each ten seconds long, meaning that together they recorded less than two minutes of what the evidence indicated was a six-minute encounter. He argued that the gaps between clips rendered the video evidence unreliable. The reviewing court disagreed, citing cases from other states and concluding that the gaps went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. In a footnote, it left open the possibility of ruling otherwise on relevance grounds on other facts, such as if gaps were so substantial that they created a risk of misleading a jury.
The court of appeals determined that the trial court had properly instructed the jury on flight as evidence of guilt. Merely leaving the scene of a crime is not sufficient to support such an instruction, but in this case, the defendant and Nicole left in a hurry, did not render aid, did not notify authorities, and eventually parked the truck in a field and spent the night there rather than returning home.
The court of appeals ruled that the trial judge correctly declined to instruct the jury on defense of a motor vehicle under G.S. 14-51.2. The defense is available to an “occupant.” Although a prior case held that a person who has just exited a motor vehicle may in some circumstances qualify as an “occupant,” the defendant here had not recently been in the vehicle and so was not an “occupant.”
Judge Murry dissented in part. He would have affirmed the conviction for assault inflicting serious bodily injury, emphasizing the brutality of the assault and arguing that the majority invaded the province of the jury by second-guessing its factual determination about the nature of Tim’s injuries.
A notice of a probation violation alleging commission of a new offense was sufficient when it identified the date of the offense, the county in which it occurred, and the case number – even though it described the offense as “assault on a female” while the defendant pled guilty to simple assault.
State v. Ferguson, __ N.C. App. __ (Mar. 18, 2026) (Lee County) (Collins, J.). In 2022, the defendant pled guilty to a drug offense and another charge and received suspended sentences and was placed on probation. In 2024, he was charged with assault on a female and pled guilty to simple assault. His probation officer then issued a violation notice alleging that he had committed “assault on a female” and referencing the case number. The notice also alleged that the defendant had tested positive for drugs and was in arrears on his probation fees. The defendant waived a formal violation hearing and admitted violating his probation. The judge activated his suspended sentences, running them consecutively. The defendant appealed.
He first argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, contending that the probation violation notice was inadequate because it referred to assault on a female while he had actually pled guilty to simple assault. The court of appeals ruled that the notice was sufficient as it “identified the date of the offense, the county in which it occurred, and the corresponding case number.” This was enough to enable the defendant to understand the allegation and to prepare a defense.
He further argued that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation, but the court of appeals disagreed, noting that G.S. 15A-1344 expressly allows a court to revoke probation when the violation is the commission of a new criminal offense.
Finally, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by running his suspended sentences consecutively rather than concurrently. The court of appeals deemed the argument moot because the defendant had already completed his active time and there were no collateral consequences that resulted from the sentences running consecutively rather than concurrently.
(1) A defendant’s momentary claim that he did not understand the nature of the sex offense charges he faced did not render his waiver of counsel invalid where the record overall demonstrated his understanding. (2) His convictions of indecent liberties were vacated because the trial court did not confirm his understanding of those charges.
State v. Ingram, __ N.C. App. __ (Mar. 18, 2026) (Brunswick County) (Tyson, J.). The defendant, a Marine, married a woman with a young daughter. He sometimes put the daughter to bed while her mother was at work. At these times, and others, he engaged in various forms of sexual contact with the daughter. Several years later, the daughter disclosed the abuse to friends and to her mother. The defendant was eventually charged with twenty-four counts of sex offense with a child by an adult, and twenty-four counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. After a bench trial, a superior court judge found him guilty on fifteen counts of each crime and not guilty on nine counts of each crime. The judge imposed a lengthy sentence and the defendant appealed.
The defendant argued that the trial court had wrongly allowed him to waive his right to counsel and to proceed pro se. Under G.S. 15A-1242, a defendant may proceed pro se only if the court is satisfied that the defendant has been advised of his right to counsel, understands the consequences of waiving that right, and “[c]omprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings.”
As to the sex offense charges, the defendant pointed to a pretrial colloquy with a judge in which he said “I do not understand the nature of” the sex offenses. However, the court of appeals noted that the defendant signed a written waiver of counsel and agreed in multiple colloquies that he understood that he was charged with the sex offenses. This established the validity of his waiver notwithstanding the one exchange in which he claimed not to understand the charges.
As to the indecent liberties charges, no judge reviewed those with the defendant or confirmed his understanding of them. Therefore, his convictions for indecent liberties were vacated, and his case was remanded for resentencing only on the sex offenses.
The trial judge did not err in excluding hateful text messages the victim, the defendant’s ex-girlfriend, sent to the defendant’s new girlfriend, where the judge admitted other text messages more directly illustrating the ex-girlfriend’s ill will towards the defendant and her possible motive to incriminate him.
State v. Sloan, __ N.C. App. __ (Mar. 18, 2026) (Mecklenburg County) (Gore, J.). On June 21, 2021, the defendant jumped out from some bushes, assaulted his ex-girlfriend, and threatened her with a gun. A friend of the ex-girlfriend captured the incident on video. On June 29, 2021, the defendant confronted his ex-girlfriend outside her parents’ house, again brandished a gun, and when she ran towards the home, fired several shots that struck the dwelling and one that injured the ex-girlfriend’s brother. The defendant pled guilty to multiple charges arising from the June 21 incident. He went to trial on multiple charges arising from the June 29 incident and was convicted. He received a lengthy sentence and appealed.
The defendant argued that the trial court erred in excluding certain insulting text messages his ex-girlfriend sent to his new girlfriend – such as calling the latter’s baby “ugly and deformed” – which he contended showed the ex-girlfriend was angry and jealous and motivated to incriminate him. The court of appeals noted that the trial judge allowed the defendant to introduce other messages that were more specific to the ex-girlfriend’s ill will towards him, and that the ex-girlfriend admitted sending hateful messages to the new girlfriend. The trial judge’s decision to exclude the additional messages as needlessly inflammatory therefore did not impair the defendant ability to present his defense and was not an abuse of discretion under Rules 607 (impeachment) and 403 (relevancy balancing).
The court of appeals also rejected the defendant’s challenges to the joinder of the June 21 charges and the June 28 charges (before he pled guilty to the June 21 charges). There was a transactional connection supporting joinder because the incidents were only eight days apart, involved the same victim, and featured similar conduct by the defendant. The reviewing court likewise rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the June 21 incident under Rule 404(b), noting that the similarities between the incidents supported admission to show identity, intent, motive, and modus operandi. The trial court’s limiting instruction adequately prevented any Rule 403 undue prejudice).
The court declined to invoke Rule 2 to review an unpreserved constitutional challenge to the defendant’s convictions of felon in possession of a firearm. Finally, it remanded the case for the correction of a clerical error in the judgment.
Requiring registered sex offenders to disclose their online identifiers is not a facial violation of the First Amendment.
State v. Smathers, __ N.C. App. __ (Mar. 18, 2026) (Buncombe County) (Arrowood, J.). In 2010, the defendant was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child. He was required to register as a sex offender. Specifically, he was required to provide the sheriff with his “online identifiers.” He provided the sheriff with a Gmail username and a Grindr username. In 2023, he was on post-release supervision for an unrelated matter when his supervising officer conducted a warrantless search of his phone. She found a Snapchat account, and he admitted using the account to send photographs of his penis.
He was charged with failing to register an online identifier – his Snapchat username – and with being a habitual felon. He moved to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. A superior court judge denied the motion. He was tried and convicted, sentenced to prison, and appealed.
On appeal, the defendant pursued a facial challenge to the online identifier registration requirement. The court of appeals acknowledged that the internet is a vital tool for expressive activity, and that requiring offenders to provide their identifiers to the government “place[s] an indirect burden” on offenders First Amendment rights and may deter some speech. Because the requirement is content neutral, the court determined that intermediate scrutiny was the proper standard for determining its constitutionality. Such review asks whether the requirement is justified by an important purpose, is narrowly tailored, and leaves open ample alternative avenues for communication.
The court ruled that the online identifier law serves the important government interest of preventing sex offenders – who it stated were at an elevated risk of recidivism – from using the internet to contact minors for illicit purposes.
The case focused on what the defendant argued was a lack of narrow tailoring. He pointed out that the statute requires the disclosure of all online identifiers, even for platforms that can’t plausibly be used to contact minors, and that it applies to all registered sex offenders, even those with no history of using the internet to identify and contact victims. The court quickly rejected the latter point, stating that it would be naïve to believe “that an offender who met his first young victim in a public park would therefore be unlikely to pursue his next victim online.”
As to requiring the disclosure of identifiers for platforms not useful for contacting potential victims, the court rejected as contrary to the plain language of the statute the State’s proposal to read the requirement narrowly to apply only to identifiers related to “private, person-to-person communication.” And the court acknowledged that the breadth of the requirement could enable First Amendment violations, such as if a sheriff were to reveal an online identifier that an offender used to engage in political blogging, effectively silencing the offender.
Nonetheless, the court determined that these risks were not disproportionate to the legitimate sweep of the statute. The court highlighted that the statute does not prohibit any speech, and that offenders retain the right to engage in anonymous speech offline, such as through “distribut[ing] anonymous handbills.”
The court also considered whether the state is overbroad in allowing public disclosure of an offender’s online identifiers under certain circumstances. Concluding that it did not, the court decided that the statute was sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive intermediate scrutiny. It therefore affirmed the defendant’s conviction.