This post summarizes published criminal opinions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina released on August 14, 2026. The court released twelve such opinions on that day, some quite lengthy. Therefore, a previous post summarized the first six opinions, and this post summarizes the remaining cases.

Review was improvidently granted in a case concerning the extent to which the odor of cannabis supports probable cause to search a vehicle. That issue was recently addressed in detail in two other cases.

State v. Scheine, No. 305PA24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Mecklenburg Co.) (Berger). This was one of three cases in which the Supreme Court granted review to consider the extent to which the odor of cannabis may support probable cause to search a vehicle in light of the legality of smokable hemp products. The court previously issued opinions in State v. Dobson, __ N.C. __, 929 S.E.2d 315 (N.C. 2026), and State v. Rowdy, __ N.C. __, 929 S.E.2d 324 (N.C. 2026), concluding that probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances and that the odor of cannabis is one factor that may be considered. (Phil Dixon discussed those cases in this prior post.) In Scheine, the court determined that its prior decisions had already resolved the question presented and that the Court of Appeals’ opinion was consistent with the Supreme Court’s prior decisions. The court therefore determined that discretionary review had been improvidently granted, leaving “the opinion below . . . undisturbed.”

(1) A habitual felon indictment may be returned prior to the defendant’s commission of a principal felony. (2) There was insufficient evidence that the defendant maintained a vehicle for purposes of keeping drugs where the drugs were in a backpack and there was no indication that the defendant left them in the vehicle when not using the vehicle to transport them.

State v. Garmon, No. 329A24 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Union Co.) (Riggs). Officers suspected the defendant of drug activity. In October 2020, they conducted a traffic stop and, through a K-9 sniff, developed probable cause to search his car. They found a backpack full of drugs and paraphernalia in the vehicle. In January 2021, a grand jury indicted the defendant for drug trafficking, maintaining a vehicle for keeping or selling drugs, and other offenses.

Earlier, in January 2020, before the traffic stop, a grand jury indicted the defendant for being a habitual felon, presumably in connection with other charges from that time period. (The opinions issued in this case by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court do not explain the context in which the habitual felon indictment arose, nor do they indicate the status or disposition of any prior charges. The record for this case is not available online, so I was not able to locate further information on those points.)

In August 2022, the defendant went to trial on the charges arising from the traffic stop. The jury convicted him of drug trafficking and maintaining a vehicle. He then pleaded guilty to the earlier habitual felon indictment and was sentenced as a habitual felon.

In the Court of Appeals, the defendant contended that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for maintaining a vehicle. He also filed an MAR arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the habitual felon indictment because it had been returned before he committed the drug offenses at issue and so could not be ancillary to them under State v. Ross, 221 N.C. App. 185 (2012). The court agreed with him on the habitual felon issue but, over a dissent, rejected his sufficiency argument.

The Supreme Court granted review. As to the habitual felon indictment, the court unanimously overruled Ross, stating:

Nothing in the [habitual felon] statute requires specific timing for either the habitual felon indictment or the principal felony indictment. The two indictments must be separate, but the State need not wait for a principal felony indictment to file a habitual felon indictment. In fact, since all that is required to indict a defendant for attaining habitual felon status is his or her conviction for three separate felony offenses, the indictment could logically come at any time after the third felony conviction and is not dependent on when the fourth felony offense is charged. The plain language of the Habitual Felon Act does not prohibit the filing of a habitual felon indictment before a defendant is indicted for a principal felony.

As to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the charge of maintaining a vehicle, the court determined that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant maintained the vehicle for the purpose of keeping drugs. The drugs were in a backpack and there was no evidence that he left them in the vehicle except when he was using the vehicle to transport them. The court remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider whether there was sufficient evidence that the defendant maintained the vehicle for the purpose of selling drugs.

When a person is “forced to leave” their home, vehicle, or office “by physical means or fear,” the person remains an “occupant” of the premises or vehicle and is eligible for the protection of the castle doctrine.

State v. Williams, No. 21PA25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Wake Co.) (Riggs). Ms. Lewis dated Mr. Penny for eight months. They broke up but remained in contact. Ms. Lewis began communicating with the defendant and eventually went for a ride with him in his car. They returned to Ms. Lewis’s house after the drive and parked briefly at the curb. Mr. Penny appeared.

Witnesses testified to different versions of what happened next, but in the light most favorable to the defendant, Mr. Penny opened the passenger door of the defendant’s car, leaned over Ms. Lewis, and began punching the defendant. Mr. Penny then drew a gun, but the defendant wrested it from him. Mr. Penny continued punching the defendant. The defendant opened the driver’s side door and exited the vehicle. Mr. Penny came quickly around the front of the car, seemingly to further assault the defendant, when the defendant fatally shot him.

The defendant was charged with first-degree murder. He claimed self-defense and requested that the jury be instructed on the castle doctrine contained in G.S. 14-51.2 (creating a rebuttable presumption that a “lawful occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or workplace” held a “reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm” when using force against a person who “was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a home, motor vehicle, or workplace” or who “had removed or was attempting to remove another . . . from the home, motor vehicle, or workplace”). The trial judge agreed to instruct on self-defense but declined to instruct on the castle doctrine because the defendant was outside the vehicle when he shot Mr. Penny. The jury convicted the defendant of involuntary manslaughter.

The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the term “occupant” was “ambiguous” and holding that it could, under certain circumstances, encompass a person who had just left a home, vehicle, or workplace. The defendant in this case, allegedly driven from his vehicle by Mr. Penny’s attack, was entitled to have the jury consider his claim to have been an “occupant,” so they jury should have been instructed on the castle doctrine.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with some modifications. It found no ambiguity in the term “occupant”:

The legislature plainly intended the protection of the castle doctrine to extend to a lawful occupant who was being forced to leave, by physical means or fear, the protection of the occupant’s vehicle. The “occupant” does not lose their “lawful occupant” status when the occupant only chooses to leave the safety of his or her vehicle because of the unlawful and forceful actions of the intruder.

The Court left for another day any questions about what constitutes forcing an occupant to leave, or how long after departure the occupant remains an occupant. In the case at bar, the defendant was entitled to the castle doctrine instruction because in the light most favorable to him, the evidence showed that he “exited his vehicle during the attack and only in response to it.” And the instructional error was prejudicial because the jury’s verdict of involuntary manslaughter suggested that the jurors concluded that the defendant acted in self-defense but was excessive in using deadly force – exactly the type of force that is presumptively justified under the castle doctrine. The court therefore ordered a new trial.

Justice Berger dissented. He would have held that the defendant was not an “occupant” because he “voluntarily excited his motor vehicle” and was outside it at the time of the shooting.

When a registered sex offender petitions for removal from the registry, the petition is denied as premature under SORNA, and the registrant does not appeal, the law of the case bars future petitions until the pertinent SORNA time period has run.

State v. Lingerfelt, No. 38A25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (McDowell Co.) (Dietz). The introduction to the court’s opinion aptly summarizes the matter:

In 2003, Defendant William David Lingerfelt pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual activity by a substitute parent. As a result, Lingerfelt was required to register as a sex offender.

Under state law, a person cannot petition to be removed from the sex offender registry until they meet the requirements of the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.

 Under SORNA, offenders convicted of “Tier I” offenses cannot petition for removal until 15 years after the date of registration. Those convicted of “Tier II” offenses must wait 25 years before seeking removal.

 In 2019, Lingerfelt petitioned to be removed from the sex offender registry. The trial court denied the petition after determining that Lingerfelt was a Tier II offender, meaning he had to wait 25 years from his initial 2003 registration to seek removal. Lingerfelt did not appeal this ruling, although it was a final, appealable judgment.

In 2023, Lingerfelt again petitioned to be removed from the registry. The trial court again denied the petition because he was a Tier II offender and not yet eligible. This time, Lingerfelt appealed, arguing that he was a Tier I offender, not a Tier II offender, and thus was eligible for removal under SORNA.

The dispositive question for this Court is whether the failure to appeal the 2019 order bars Lingerfelt from contesting the legal ruling that he is a Tier II offender. As explained below, we hold that successive petitions to terminate sex offender registration are all parts of the same underlying case and subject to the doctrine of law of the case [not collateral estoppel, which is an affirmative defense that the State did not present]. Applying that doctrine here, Lingerfelt is procedurally barred from challenging his designation as a Tier II offender because he failed to appeal from the first judgment in this case addressing that legal question.

The court therefore did not attempt to decide whether Lingerfelt’s conviction was, in fact, a Tier I or Tier II offense. The court also stated its view that the law of the case does not apply to prevent a successive petition when the earlier petition was denied because of a judge’s determination that the defendant remains a “potential threat to public safety” rather than on SORNA grounds. A defendant’s dangerousness may change over time and the relevant statute expressly allows a successive petition to be filed one year after a denial, which the majority viewed as an invitation to courts to continue to reassess dangerousness. See G.S. 14-208.12A(a3).

Justice Riggs, joined by Justice Earls, dissented. She would have held that the statutory provision allowing successive petitions renders the law of the case inapplicable. She also viewed reliance on the law of the case as inappropriate given that the doctrine was never raised by the State, and indeed, was expressly disclaimed by it. (The issue was raised initially by a Justice during oral argument.)

A defendant waived his right to court-appointed counsel when he filed two handwritten waivers and, during a colloquy after the withdrawal of his fifth attorney, did not request the appointment of a sixth.

State v. McGirt, No. 91A25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Wake Co.) (Earls). The defendant was charged with child sex offenses. He was determined to be indigent and a public defender was appointed. The public defender withdrew two months later due to a conflict. A private attorney was appointed, but soon left private practice and withdrew. A third attorney was appointed but allowed to withdraw due to “personal reasons.” A fourth attorney was appointed but was allowed to withdraw after the defendant filed a motion expressing dissatisfaction with her. A fifth attorney was appointed. The defendant wrote to the judge asking to “fire” the attorney and expressing dissatisfaction. The attorney moved to withdraw.

Shortly before trial, the court heard the fifth attorney’s motion and allowed him to withdraw. The judge noted that the defendant had filed two handwritten documents entitled “waiver of counsel.” The judge further discussed representation with the defendant. The defendant expressed dissatisfaction with his previous attorneys and did not request that another be appointed. The judge found a waiver of counsel but appointed standby counsel.

A week before trial, the defendant requested that counsel be appointed. The judge denied the motion based on the waiver. At trial, standby counsel cross-examined the State’s witnesses and the defendant otherwise represented himself. He was convicted and received a long sentence.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant had neither waived nor forfeited his right to counsel and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed.

As a constitutional matter, the right to counsel may be waived only if the defendant “clearly and unequivocally” expresses a desire to proceed without counsel. As a statutory matter, G.S. 15A-1242 requires a “thorough inquiry” into the defendant’s desire and awareness of consequences. However, no “magic words” are required and the nature of a waiver must be assessed under the totality of the circumstances.

Applying these principles to this case, the court concluded:

Viewing the record as a whole, the evidence establishes that Mr. McGirt clearly and unequivocally expressed his desire to waive counsel and proceed pro se. That expression was not confined to a single moment but was the culmination of a sustained course of conduct spanning approximately fifty months and five appointed attorneys—a course of conduct that, particularly in its final stages, left no doubt as to Mr. McGirt’s intentions. This course of conduct was then confirmed in the court’s colloquy with Mr. McGirt.

The court pointed to the defendant’s written waivers, his dissatisfaction with his fourth and fifth attorneys, and his failure to request a sixth attorney as particularly compelling. The court also ruled that any error by the trial judge in informing the defendant of the potential punishment he faced did not violate G.S. 15A-1242 because, under State v. Fenner, 387 N.C. 330 (2025), there is no violation where both the actual punishment and the judge’s misstatement amount to a de facto life sentence.

Chief Justice Newby concurred separately. He agreed that the “disposition of the case does not require us to consider whether defendant forfeited his right to counsel. Regardless, [he wrote] separately to address forfeiture in hopes of clarifying some lingering confusion about its relationship with waiver.” His opinion generally distinguished between a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel and a forfeiture of the right based on obstructive behavior.

The Court of Appeals properly granted a petition for certiorari where trial counsel failed to file a notice of appeal despite defendant’s express desire to appeal. Both merit/probable error and extraordinary circumstances were present.

State v. Martinez, No. 101PA25 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Wilson Co.) (Berger). The defendant was convicted of burglary. He wanted to appeal, but his lawyer didn’t file a notice of appeal. Defendant petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari “seeking a belated appeal” based on counsel’s inaction. The court dismissed the petition without prejudice, essentially inviting the defendant to refile “includ[ing] any issues of potential merit petitioner believes would be raised on appeal.” He filed another petition, contending that prejudice is presumed when counsel fails to perfect an appeal under Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232 (2019). The court allowed the petition and remanded the case to superior court to consider appointment of appellate counsel and related matters.

The State asked the Supreme Court to review the case. It agreed and unanimously affirmed the Court of Appeals. First, it rejected the State’s argument that the second panel of the Court of Appeals overruled the first by granting the petition. The first panel had not denied the petition – it had dismissed it with an invitation to refile. Second, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals had correctly applied the legal standard for petitions for certiorari as set forth in Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCAs, 384 N.C. 569 (2023), which requires (a) a showing of merit or probable error below and (b) a showing of exceptional circumstances. Here, trial counsel’s failure to pursue the appeal provided the merit or probable error, and the loss of the defendant’s right to appeal amounted to extraordinary circumstances.