This post summarizes the published criminal opinions released by the Supreme Court of North Carolina on October 23, 2026.
A defendant who fled before sentencing violated an implied condition of his plea agreement, so when a judge later imposed a more severe sentence than the one set out in the plea agreement, the defendant was not entitled to an opportunity to withdraw his plea under G.S. 15A-1024
State v. Latta, No. 139PA25 (Oct. 23, 2026) (Durham Co.) (Allen). The defendant and an accomplice robbed several victims at gunpoint. The defendant was arrested and charged with multiple counts of armed robbery and attempted armed robbery as well as a single count of second-degree kidnapping that resulted from moving a victim from one place to another. The defendant agreed to plead guilty to all the charges in exchange for the prosecution’s support of “a prison sentence of sixty-one to eighty-three months if defendant cooperated and testified truthfully in his codefendant’s prosecution.”
The defendant fled North Carolina before sentencing. His case was dismissed with leave to reinstate. Over time, he accumulated numerous criminal convictions in other states. Twenty years after the robberies, he was arrested in Vance County on drug charges. The robbery and kidnapping charges were then reinstated.
The defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea. The prosecution objected, arguing that the retirement of the lead officer and the death of one of the victims would make a new prosecution very difficult. A superior court judge agreed with the State and denied the motion. The case proceeded to sentencing.
The defendant’s criminal convictions over the past twenty years increased his prior record level from I to IV. The 61 to 83 month sentence the parties had originally contemplated was no longer permissible under Structured Sentencing. The judge imposed a mitigated sentence of 71 to 95 months in prison.
The defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals found no error in the judge’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. However, it ruled that the judge’s sentence should have triggered G.S. 15A-1024, which states in part: “If at the time of sentencing, the judge for any reason determines to impose a sentence other than provided for in a plea arrangement between the parties, the judge must inform the defendant of that fact and inform the defendant that he may withdraw his plea.” The Court of Appeals remanded the case so that the judge could impose the 61 to 83 month sentence, or in the alternative, could allow the defendant to withdraw his plea.
The Supreme Court granted discretionary review. Justice Allen wrote an opinion for the unanimous court, discerning no error in the sentence imposed by the superior court judge. The judge was not required to impose the sentence referenced in the plea agreement because (1) by its terms, the agreement applied only after a judicial finding that the defendant had cooperated against his codefendant, and there was no evidence in the record that such a finding had been made, and (2) in any event, the defendant breached an implied condition of his plea agreement by fleeing before sentencing. On the latter point, the court cited United States v. David, 58 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 1995), where the court ruled that every plea agreement contains an implied requirement that the defendant attend sentencing. Because the defendant violated his plea agreement, the agreement did not control his sentence and the imposition of a sentence not contemplated by the plea agreement did not trigger G.S. 15A-1024. The court concluded by noting that “it would be profoundly unjust to allow defendant to leverage his post-plea crimes to escape the consequences of his guilty plea.”
(1) Jury instructions and a verdict sheet were not “models of clarity” but were not so deficient that they amounted to plain error. (2) Evidence that the defendant stole a working late-model vehicle was sufficient to establish felony larceny by value despite the lack of direct evidence of the vehicle’s worth.
State v. Montanino, 165A24 (Oct. 23, 2026) (Durham Co.) (Barringer). The defendant beat a female acquaintance to death and stole her car. He was arrested and charged with first-degree murder under two theories: premeditation and deliberation, and felony murder based on the larceny of the victim’s vehicle.
At the conclusion of the trial, a superior court judge instructed the jury on each theory of first-degree murder and on several lesser-included offenses. The verdict sheet submitted to the jury included the various offenses and provided the jury space to address premeditation and deliberation separately from felony murder, but it did not include a space for returning an overall verdict of not guilty, and the judge’s instructions on that point were not perfectly clear. The jury found that the theory of premeditation and deliberation was not established but convicted the defendant of first-degree felony murder.
The defendant appealed. He contended that the jury instructions and verdict sheet were erroneous and did not provide the jury with an option to acquit. Because he had not objected to the jury instructions or the verdict sheet, the Court of Appeals reviewed for plain error and found none. However, a majority of that court sided with the defendant on an alternative argument, that the State has presented no evidence about the value of the victim’s car, rendering the evidence of felony murder insufficient.
The state supreme court granted review. Justice Barringer wrote the lead opinion for a mostly unanimous court. Regarding the jury instructions and verdict sheet, the court emphasized that plain error is a high hurdle under State v. Reber, 386 N.C.153 (2024). Although the instructions and verdict sheet in this case were not “models of clarity,” the trial judge did advise the jury that not guilty was a possible verdict, and the jury showed its understanding of its authority by finding that the premeditation and deliberation theory had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the evidence at trial supported the jury’s verdict so the defendant could not show that a “slightly altered” instruction and verdict sheet would have changed the outcome of the case.
As to the issue concerning the value of the vehicle, the court acknowledged that the State did not introduce any specific, direct evidence on point. However, the court held that “direct evidence of value is not required when the property at issue is so ubiquitous that the average juror, using his or her general knowledge and experience, can determine that the property’s value is above the statutory threshold with a high degree of certainty.” The evidence at trial indicated that the vehicle was just six years old and in good working condition. That was sufficient for the jury to infer that it was worth more than one thousand dollars, rendering its theft a felony under G.S. 14-72(a).
Justice Berger concurred in part. He noted precedent to the effect that plain error review applies only to instructional and evidentiary errors. Because a verdict sheet is neither an instruction nor evidence, his position was that the court should not have reviewed any alleged errors in the verdict sheet.
Justice Riggs concurred but wrote separately “to emphasize that direct evidence of value will be required in most [felony larceny by value] cases and the State still bears the burden of proving the value element.” Justice Earls joined Justice Riggs’s opinion.