The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Chemuti, __ N.C. __, 920 S.E.2d 810 (2025), clarified the interplay between the statutory provisions in G.S. 132-1.4A governing release of certain law enforcement agency recordings and a district court defendant’s constitutional right to compel the release of evidence necessary to present a complete defense.
A defendant in a criminal case in superior court typically receives law enforcement agency recordings related to his or her case through discovery provided by the district attorney pursuant to Article 48 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Indeed, G.S. 132-1.4A, which generally requires a superior court order for release of covered law enforcement agency recordings, contains an exception requiring a custodial law enforcement agency to release a recording to a district attorney without a court order to “comply with discovery requirements in a criminal prosecution.” G.S. 132-1.4A(h)(ii). Once the recording is provided to the district attorney, the district attorney must then provide it to the defendant. G.S. 15A-903(a).
Because the statutes requiring discovery apply only to cases within the original jurisdiction of the superior court (in other words, felonies and related misdemeanors), defendants in district court cases are not entitled to receive statutory discovery (though they are entitled to material exculpatory information under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), see State v. Marino, 229 N.C. App. 130, 136 (2013)). For that reason, defendants in criminal district court cases typically utilize a subpoena issued pursuant to G.S. 15A-802 to obtain documentary or video evidence related to the case that is held by others, including law enforcement.
In Chemuti, the court considered whether a defendant in a district court criminal case could subpoena a covered law enforcement agency recording from the law enforcement agency and thereby avoid petitioning the superior court for its release pursuant to G.S. 132-1.4A. The court concluded that the defendant could not do so because the statutory procedure in G.S. 132-1.4A supplanted the defendant’s ability to subpoena a covered recording and provided the exclusive means to obtain such recording directly from the custodial law enforcement agency. The court further construed G.S. 132-1.4A as permitting only a superior court judge to order the release of a covered recording.
Facts. Mooresville Police Department officers arrested Charlotte Chemuti in 2023 for resisting a public officer, a misdemeanor. Chemuti served a subpoena on the police department seeking “‘any bodycam videos showing the incident, arrest, and incarceration.’” ___ N.C. at ___, 920 S.E.2d at 814. The Town of Mooresville responded to the subpoena in writing, stating that the recordings could only be released pursuant to G.S. 132-1.4A.
Chemuti then filed a request with the district court to order the release of the body camera recordings. She did not provide notice to the town. The district court granted the motion, stating that the town’s written response was not a proper motion to quash.
After receiving the district court’s order and a new subpoena, the town filed a written motion to quash in district court. The town argued that the recordings were covered by G.S. 132-1.4A and thus could not be released without an order from the superior court.
The district court later entered an order explaining its view that G.S. 132-1.4A was not the only way to obtain release of a covered law enforcement agency recording and that criminal defendants in district court may subpoena law enforcement officers to appear and produce such footage. As a result, the court ordered the town to comply with the subpoena.
Procedural History. The town appealed the district court’s order to the North Carolina Court of Appeals and also sought certiorari review. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and denied certiorari review. The town then petitioned the North Carolina Supreme Court for certiorari review of the Court of Appeals’ order and direct review of the district court’s order. The Supreme Court granted review of both orders.
Analysis.
Right to appeal. The Chemuti Court first determined that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the town’s appeal as the town articulated a plausible basis for a statutory confidentiality protection that would be lost absent immediate appeal. Rather than remand the case to the intermediate appellate court, the state supreme court elected to address the merits of the district court’s order as the case presented “a question of significant importance to our State’s jurisprudence,” and a prompt resolution would permit the underlying district court criminal matter to proceed. ___ N.C. at ___, 920 S.E.2d at 815.
G.S. 132-1.4A. The court then turned to the proper interpretation of G.S. 132-1.4A, a statute that creates confidentiality protections for certain law enforcement agency recordings, including body-worn camera footage. That statute provides that such recordings are not public records, are not personnel records, and, when in the custody of a law enforcement agency, may only be released pursuant to its provisions.
The court noted that G.S. 132-1.4A(f) and (g) require a person seeking the release of a covered recording to petition the superior court in the county where the recording was made. The superior court must then exercise its discretion in determining whether to order release, considering eight statutorily enumerated factors. G.S. 132-1.4A(g). The statute further provides that covered recordings “shall only be released pursuant to court order.” Id.
The town argued that to obtain the recordings from the day of her arrest, Chemuti was required to seek a court order pursuant to G.S. 132-1.4A. Chemuti pointed out that while G.S. 132-1.4A(g) requires a “court order,” it does not specify what type of order or from which court it must come. She argued that G.S. 132.1.4A did not set out the exclusive means for obtaining access to such records and that the statute’s procedures were supplemental to traditional methods for obtaining release. Thus, she contended criminal defendants in district court could obtain a court order from a district court judge or a “‘court sanctioned’” subpoena. ___ N.C. at ___, 920 S.E.2d at 817.
The court, in a divided opinion authored by Justice Dietz, rejected Chemuti’s arguments. First, the court stated that Chemuti improperly read “pursuant to a court order” in G.S. 132-1.4A(g) in isolation. The next sentence of that subsection explains how to obtain that court order: “Any custodial law enforcement agency or any person requesting release of a recording may file an action in the superior court in any county where any portion of the recording was made for an order releasing the recording.” G.S. 132-1.4A(g). Thus, the court reasoned “the ‘court order’ described by the statute is one issued by the superior court in the county where the recording was made.” Id. at __; 920 S.E.2d at 817.
The court stated that its reasoning was underscored by: (1) the statute’s repeated references to the superior court; (2) the requirement that the superior court consider whether the person requesting the release is “seeking to obtain evidence to determine legal issues in a current or potential court proceeding,” see G.S. 132-1.4A(g)(3), noting that if the trial court in the current proceeding could always order release, this requirement would be superfluous as to those proceedings; and (3) the streamlined process in G.S. 132-1.4A(h) permitting release of recordings without a court order to a district attorney for law enforcement purposes. The court stated that though the process for release to a district attorney required release “for use in criminal proceedings in district court,” see G.S. 132-1.4A(h)(iii), the statute “expressly limits this release only to the district attorney’s use for a ‘law enforcement purpose’” and does not “authorize release to criminal defendants or to the district attorney in order to comply with a defendant’s subpoena.” Id. at __; 920 S.E.2d at 817-818.
The court acknowledged that its interpretation placed a burden on criminal defendants in district court that is not borne by criminal defendants in superior court. But it said that was an outcome the legislature intended. Thus, the court held that criminal defendants in district court cannot compel the release of recordings governed by G.S. 132.-1.4A through a subpoena; instead, they must petition the superior court for disclosure.
Finally, the court rejected Chemuti’s argument that its interpretation of the statute impermissibly burdened her constitutional right to compel the release of evidence necessary to her defense. The court reasoned that the State has a compelling interest in limiting access to law enforcement agency recordings that may contain sensitive and private information and that the procedure set forth in G.S. 132-1.4A for obtaining such recordings is not so onerous that it deprives defendants of their ability to present a defense. The court said there was no risk of tension between G.S. 132-1.4A and a defendant’s constitutional rights since ultimately a superior court must release records to which a defendant is constitutionally entitled regardless of whether the statute’s criteria permit it. “In other words,” the court explained, “the statute changes only the procedure to obtain evidence needed for a complete defense; it does not change the constitutional test to determine what evidence must be released.” Id. at ___, 920 S.E.2d at 819.
Dissent. Justice Riggs, joined by Justice Earls, dissented. The dissent would have held that G.S. 132-1.4A does not establish the exclusive method for criminal defendants in district court to request body camera footage and that the district court correctly denied the town’s motion to quash.
The dissent reasoned that while G.S. 132-1.4A(g) requires a “court order,” it does not specify that it must be a superior court order. The dissent accused the majority of improperly adding words to the statute in its effort to ascertain the legislature’s intent. The dissent explained its view that G.S. 132-1.4A(f), which states that a person “may petition the superior court,” established superior court orders as a permissive, but not mandatory, source of providing the court order required under subsection (g). To the dissent, the legislature’s intent was clear: “[W]hile defendants must obtain a court order to receive body camera footage, that order need not come from a superior court.” Id. at ___, 920 S.E.2d at 819 (Riggs, J., dissenting).
The dissent further criticized the majority’s interpretation as subjecting “district court defendants’ compulsory process rights to the discretion of superior court judges,” and making it “significantly more difficult for defendants to obtain discovery to which they are constitutionally entitled.” Id. at ___, 920 S.E.2d at 819 (Riggs, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that the majority should have interpreted G.S. 132-1.4A to avoid this potential constitutional conflict.
Finally, the dissent complained that the majority’s interpretation created a needlessly complex process that would slow the resolution of cases and sow confusion.
Takeaways. A district court defendant who wishes to obtain law enforcement recordings covered under G.S. 132-1.4A from the custodial law enforcement agency must petition the superior court to order their release. If a defendant is constitutionally entitled to a recording (because it is exculpatory or otherwise needed for a complete defense), the superior court must order its release.
A district court judge presiding over the underlying criminal matter may not order the recording’s release. Only a superior court may do so.
The court’s decision in Chemuti does not foreclose a district attorney from releasing covered law enforcement agency recordings to district court defendants without a superior court order. In many district court cases, the law enforcement agency may turn over recordings to the district attorney pursuant to G.S. 132-1.4A(h). That subsection, captioned “Release of Recordings; Law Enforcement Purposes,” provides that “a custodial law enforcement agency shall disclose or release a recording to a district attorney (i) for review of potential criminal charges, (ii) in order to comply with discovery requirements in a criminal prosecution, (iii) for use in criminal proceedings in district court, or (iv) for any other law enforcement purpose,” without a court order. While Chemuti stated that this provision did not “authorize release to criminal defendants or to the district attorney in order to comply with a defendant’s subpoena,” __ N.C. at ___; 920 S.E.2d at 818 (emphasis added), it did not state that this provision precluded a district attorney from re-releasing to a district court defendant a recording that law enforcement released to the district attorney for one of these purposes.
Indeed, the issue of a district attorney releasing a law enforcement agency recording was not before the court. Chemuti sought to obtain the recording in her case directly from the law enforcement agency, and it isn’t clear from the opinion whether the district attorney in Chemuti’s case even possessed the recording. The opinion does characterize G.S. 132-1.4A(h)(iii) as “expressly limit[ing]” release “only to the district attorney’s use for a ‘law enforcement purpose.’” Neverthless, given the issue before the court and the statute, which controls disclosure and release of recordings “in the custody of a law enforcement agency,” see G.S. 132-1.4A(c), (g), and disclosure or release by “a custodial law enforcement agency,” see G.S. 132-1.4A(h), and which does not address re-release by a district attorney, the court appears to have been considering only when a law enforcement agency may release a recording and not when a district attorney may release a recording.
Consider, for example, an impaired driving case in which the law enforcement agency releases a dashcam recording to the district attorney for use in the prosecution of a defendant charged with impaired driving in district court. The district attorney may wish to release the recording to the defendant; if the footage shows an obviously impaired defendant, viewing the footage might factor into a defendant’s decision of whether to enter a plea or proceed to trial. Chemuti does not require the district attorney to first obtain an order from the superior court before releasing the recording, and neither does G.S. 132-1.4A appear to impose such a requirement.